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Finding Customary International Law 
Ryan M. Scoville* 
ABSTRACT: Established doctrine holds that customary international law 
(“CIL”) arises from general and consistent state practice that is backed by a 
sense of legal obligation. Contemporary litigation requires federal courts to 
apply this doctrine to identify the contours of CIL in a diverse collection of 
cases ranging from civil actions under the Alien Tort Statute to criminal 
prosecutions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. This Article 
provides an in-depth look at how federal judges carry out this task. 
Conducting a citation analysis of opinions published since the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, this Article analyzes the 
form, quality, and geographical origins of the authorities that tend to serve as 
evidence of custom; explores the implications of recent citation patterns; and 
offers ideas to help courts grapple more effectively with the challenge of finding 
custom. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions about customary international law (“CIL”) arise in a wide 
variety of federal litigation. For example, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) 
provides the district courts with jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”1 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that the 
statute’s reference to the “law of nations”—the old term for CIL—empowers 
federal courts to recognize common law causes of action for violations of 
international norms that are “accepted by the civilized world” and defined 
with adequate specificity.2 Plaintiffs have since relied on the ATS to bring tort 
claims against multinational corporations, foreign and U.S. officials, 
governments, and private individuals for torture, extrajudicial killing, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes, among other acts.3 In many of these cases, 
a central question is whether custom prohibits the alleged conduct. 
As another example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 
provides that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of federal and 
state courts unless a statutory exception to immunity applies.4 One such 
exception strips immunity in certain cases “in which rights in property taken 
in violation of international law are in issue.”5 To decide whether this 
language applies, federal courts must often identify the circumstances in 
which CIL prohibits governmental takings of private property.6 
Similar issues arise in criminal cases. One federal statute establishes a 
penalty of life in prison for anyone who, “on the high seas, commits the crime 
of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or 
found in the United States.”7 In applying this text, courts have looked to CIL 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
3.  See, e.g., John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (forced 
labor); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (war crimes). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
5.  Id. § 1605(a)(3).
6.  See, e.g., LaLoup v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Agudas Chasidei
Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed’n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2006);. 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
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to resolve issues such as whether piracy encompasses acts of aiding and 
abetting,8 and whether it includes acts of violence that do not accompany a 
robbery.9 Elsewhere, judicial efforts to discern custom are often necessary to 
apply the so-called Charming Betsy canon, which requires a court to interpret 
an ambiguous statute in a way that avoids conflict with international law.10 
Finally, questions about CIL arise in constitutional interpretation. In 
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, for example, the government prosecuted 
several foreign nationals under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(“MDLEA”) for engaging in drug trafficking in the territorial waters of 
Panama.11 In response, the defendants argued that the statutory prohibition 
is unconstitutional—while Article I grants Congress the power to “define and 
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,”12 and while that power 
confers authority to criminalize conduct that CIL prohibits,13 custom does not 
prohibit drug trafficking.14 Persuaded by this argument, the court invalidated 
the statute as applied and vacated the convictions.15 
As a matter of international law and federal common law, it is clear what 
courts should do when faced with these kinds of issues. The traditional 
doctrine is that a rule of CIL arises from a “general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”16 A correct analysis 
would thus seek to answer two questions: first, is there a general and consistent 
state practice on the given issue? And second, to the extent such a practice 
exists, have states engaged in it out of a sense of international legal obligation 
(otherwise known as opinio juris)? With respect to the first question, the 
predominant view is that a practice cannot be “general” unless, at a minimum, 
a “large share of [the] affected states” have engaged in it,17 that the 
8.  See United States v. Ali, 982 F. Supp. 2d 85, 86 (D.D.C. 2013).
9.  See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603, 640–41 (E.D. Va. 2010).
10.  See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See generally
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role 
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (examining the canon’s origins and justifications). 
11. United States v. Bellaizac–Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012).
12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
13.  See Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of
Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1682 (2012) (“The originalist evidence strongly supports 
the view that Congress can define only offenses that already exist in international law.”). 
14.  Bellaizac–Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1248–49.
15.  Id. at 1258. For other examples, see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015)
(relying in part on CIL to define the scope of the President’s recognition power), and Brown v. 
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (using the law of nations in interpreting the 
Captures Clause). 
16.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also Bellaizac–Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1252 (“We agree with our sister 
circuits that customary international law is determined by examining state practice and opinio 
juris . . . .”).  
17. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 150
(2005); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th 
ed. 2012) (suggesting that CIL requires “substantial uniformity” in state practice). 
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requirement of consistency necessitates steady adherence even if not 
“absolutely rigorous conformity,”18 and that the occurrence of a practice over 
a substantial period of time supports, but is not strictly necessary for the 
development of a norm.19 It is also widely accepted that state practice can take 
diverse forms, including diplomatic acts, statutes, judicial decisions, official 
statements, and regulations, among others.20 The purpose of the second 
question is to ensure that measures undertaken as a matter of mere courtesy, 
habit, or policy do not automatically acquire the status of law.21 A critical 
consequence of these rules is that questions about CIL are substantially 
empirical; one cannot identify a norm without first investigating the practices 
and views of the various states that comprise the international order. This 
limitation reflects the positivist notion that custom’s legitimacy depends upon 
state consent.22 
But while the basic rules for ascertaining CIL are fairly clear,23 adhering 
to them presents a serious challenge for the federal judiciary. In part, the 
difficulty is one of limited resources, both institutional and human: courts 
have easy access to cases, statutes, and other types of domestic authority for 
questions about U.S. law, but the same is not true with respect to international 
custom. Court filings tend not to reflect exhaustive analyses.24 There is no 
complete database—electronic or otherwise—of state practice and opinio 
juris.25 And any judge bold enough to attempt research into original sources 
would immediately confront linguistic, cultural, and historical barriers that 
could challenge even a seasoned comparativist. 
Say, for instance, litigants raise a question about the scope of diplomatic 
immunity for special envoys under CIL. An examination of the official 
practices of China and Russia—two of the most influential states in the 
contemporary order—would seem to constitute a necessary part of any 
18. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 ¶ 186 (June 27). 
19.  Cf. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/69/10,
¶ 138 n.829 (2014) (“Provided that [a] practice is sufficiently general and consistent, no 
particular duration is required.”). 
20.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (explaining that state action can take the form of “diplomatic acts 
and instructions as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements 
of policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states”). 
21.  Id. § 102 cmt. c.
22.  BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–17 (2010).
23. To be sure, many other aspects of CIL, such as the relative importance of state practice
and opinio juris, are contested. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International 
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000) (critiquing CIL as conceptually flawed and illegitimate).  
24. The evidence of this is anecdotal but seemingly widespread. See infra note 85 (providing 
examples). 
25.  Cf. Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening
the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 897–98 (2011) (discussing 
limited research options as a problem for judges who must apply foreign law).  
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thorough analysis. Yet where does one go to identify those practices? Foreign 
materials are a daunting option. Even if a judge manages to collect them, she 
would also have to arrange for translation and then learn enough about the 
Chinese and Russian legal systems to appreciate the sources’ meaning and 
significance in context. Moreover, even if the judge overcomes these hurdles 
and correctly identifies the foreign state practice, she would still face the 
additional task of determining whether China and Russia pursued that 
practice out of a sense of international legal obligation rather than for some 
other purpose. These difficulties only grow as the inquiry shifts to the 
practices of smaller and less connected countries in the developing world. 
The result is substantial epistemic uncertainty. 
This Article seeks to answer a simple question: faced with an imperative 
to ascertain customary international law, and with the various institutional 
and other limitations that interfere with rigorous analysis of state practice and 
opinio juris, how do federal courts proceed? In other words, how do courts go 
about finding custom? 
The answer will carry real significance, both for litigants and U.S. foreign 
relations. As the preceding examples illustrate, the contours of CIL can 
dictate whether victims are entitled to compensation from perpetrators of 
mass atrocities, decide foreign sovereign immunity, and determine the ambit 
and constitutionality of criminal statutes. Moreover, the process by which 
federal courts ascertain custom may either contribute to or undermine U.S. 
foreign relations and the international rule of law. For instance, if courts 
respond to resource limitations by engaging in variant and unpredictable 
research strategies or relying on untrustworthy secondary sources, then it may 
be difficult for parties to anticipate the content of custom on their own, and 
U.S. courts might adopt conclusions that are at odds with prevailing global 
norms. Further, analysis that is under-inclusive with respect to the number of 
states considered might weaken the legitimacy of custom by exposing it as a 
set of rules over which many states have little to no de facto influence. 
Given the stakes, it is no surprise that the judicial application of CIL has 
attracted a lot of attention over the years. Scholars have scrutinized various 
dimensions of the topic, including judges’ tendency to think about 
international law through the lens of constitutional law26 and the risk of norm 
fragmentation that accompanies the application of CIL in national fora with 
divergent legal traditions and political cultures.27 Scholars have also surveyed 
the Supreme Court’s application of CIL from the founding of the United 
States to the close of the twentieth century,28 examined the use of CIL in 
26.  See Andrea Bianchi, International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15
EUR. J. INT’L L. 751, 751 (2004). 
27.  See ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
217–43 (2011). 
28.  See David J. Bederman, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 89–123 (David L. 
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statutory interpretation,29 collected anecdotal evidence of judicial methods,30 
and elaborated on the various problems that attend judicial efforts to apply 
custom.31 What is missing is a systematic, empirical account of contemporary 
methods of proof. 
In an effort to improve understanding of the process by which federal 
courts ascertain custom, I conducted a study of the citations contained in all 
reported federal cases in which a court has drawn a legal conclusion about 
the existence or contours of a customary international norm since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.32 The cases span a little 
more than a decade and include over 250 separate conclusions on a wide 
variety of issues from district and appellate courts throughout the country. 
Given Sosa’s admonition for courts to scrutinize custom-based claims,33 this 
collection should include the federal judiciary’s most rigorous analyses of 
CIL. In evaluating the results, I hope to identify trends and problems in the 
judicial method, and generate ideas on how to mitigate current challenges. 
This project draws heavy inspiration from the work of Stephen Choi and 
Mitu Gulati, who recently examined how international courts go about 
finding custom.34 Based on a collection of judgments from the International 
Court of Justice and its predecessor, plus a handful of decisions from other 
international tribunals, Choi and Gulati report on the kinds of materials cited 
in analyses of customary international law, the types of evidence that are most 
likely to yield affirmative conclusions about the existence of a norm, the 
relationships between norm categories and citation patterns, and the effects 
of variables such as time period and opinion status, whether majority or 
dissent.35 Their work supplies valuable insights. They find, for example, that 
“treaties are the most important type of evidence in CIL determinations,”36 
Sloss et al. eds., 2011); William S. Dodge, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 
1946–2000, in id. at 353–79; Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 
1901–1945, in id. at 225–56. 
29.  See generally Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118 (2014). 
30. A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1475, 1494–1500 (2003) (examining the application of jus cogens norms in a collection of 
nineteen federal appellate decisions). 
31.  See, e.g., Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and
International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2007); John F. Coyle, The Case for 
Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433, 460–62 (2015); Julian Ku & John 
Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 153, 181–89; Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1243, 1246–51 (2004); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 680–84 (1986); Weisburd, supra note 30, at 1478–84.  
32. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
33.  Id. at 725–31.
34.  See generally Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do it?, 
in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016). 
35.  Id. at 131–46.
36.  Id. at 132.
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that UN materials and domestic statutes “also play a big role,”37 and that 
tribunals rely on academic sources somewhat infrequently.38 What 
distinguishes my study is principally the target: U.S. courts rather than 
international tribunals. I anticipate that a comparison of results will further 
clarify the features of CIL analysis in these different settings. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the research 
methodology. Part II provides context for the results by reporting on the kinds 
of cases, courts, and legal questions that are generating precedent on 
customary international law in the United States. Part III reveals the key 
results, including data on the types and nationalities of sources that federal 
courts have considered in reaching conclusions about custom. These data 
show three clear patterns: parochialism, multilateralism, and “delegation.”39 
First, judicial analyses are parochial in the sense that they rest primarily on 
U.S. government sources, particularly federal case law. Official sources from 
other advanced democracies, such as the United Kingdom and France, also 
play a role, but only on occasion, and citations to the legal authorities of all 
other governments are virtually nonexistent. Second, judicial analyses are 
multilateral in the sense that courts often cite important treaties and the work 
of international organizations. Third, analyses frequently delegate the task of 
ascertaining CIL to scholars by relying in part on academic writing in books 
and law reviews, particularly from American authors. As a doctrinal matter, 
this particular maneuver would be unproblematic if the academic sources 
reflected meticulous and inclusive studies of state practice and opinio juris, but 
they often do not. Conducting a separate study of citations contained in the 
academic sources to which courts have cited, I find that much of the academic 
writing on which courts have relied exhibits the same tendencies as the 
judicial opinions. Most of the cited scholars did not attempt to survey state 
practice and opinio juris, and even when they did they focused principally on 
the West. To this extent, contemporary CIL retains the under-inclusive and 
overwhelmingly occidental genealogy of the historical law of nations.40 Part 
IV explores the implications of these findings, and Part V offers ideas to help 
courts grapple more effectively with the challenge of finding custom. 
The analysis proceeds on certain normative assumptions. In particular, I 
assume the traditional test for CIL is a good one, that legal practice and formal 
doctrine should align, and that a globally inclusive approach to the 
identification of custom is desirable. One might fairly question some of these 
positions, but I view such debates as beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
My primary purpose is description. 
37.  Id. at 133.
38.  See id.
39. Choi and Gulati coined this usage. See id. at 127.
40.  Cf. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (exploring the colonial origins and features of public international law). 
1900  IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1893 
II. METHODOLOGY
I performed a study of the volume and types of citations that federal 
judges include in their opinions in the course of reaching conclusions about 
customary international law. A key assumption behind this project—that 
citations matter—underlies a substantial collection of citation-count studies41 
and likely holds true for a couple of reasons. One is that citations provide at 
least partial evidence of the internal reasoning that drives judicial decision-
making—judges typically do not cite sources they never considered, and 
typically do cite sources that mattered most in their reasoning. The other is 
that citations influence subsequent litigation, in part because they confer on 
the chosen sources an authority that increases the likelihood of their future 
use, and in part because they signal permissible research and argument 
strategies for other parties and judges. Citation patterns thus offer valuable 
insight into past and future case outcomes. 
The study proceeded in several steps. I started by performing a Boolean 
search42 of all reported federal43 opinions that mention customary 
international law from July 2015 back to the date of the Supreme Court’s 
2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,44 yielding a list of over 700 cases. I 
chose this time period in part because it generated a little more than a decade 
of precedent—enough to understand how contemporary courts ascertain 
custom, but not so much as to be insurmountably voluminous. I also chose 
this period because, in theory, most CIL analysis in the post-Sosa era should 
be qualitatively different than that of earlier periods. Sosa’s principal lesson is 
that federal courts must carefully scrutinize CIL claims—a court needs to 
ensure that the alleged norm is not only “accepted by the civilized world,” but 
also defined with adequate specificity.45 One would expect courts operating 
41.  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (As a Means
to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1283–86 (2007) (summarizing this work). 
42. I used the following search terms in Westlaw’s “Federal Cases” database: [“customary
international law” or “law of nations” or “opinio juris” or “jus cogens” or “international custom” or 
“customary norm” or “customary international norm” or “international custom” or “international 
norm” or “international practice”]. The search was last performed on July 15, 2015. 
43. I began with the goal of also scrutinizing how state courts find CIL, and performed an
identical search in Westlaw’s “All State Cases” database. This search produced an initial list of 140 
cases, but hardly any of them analyzed CIL. A clear majority contained nothing more than 
summary rejections of the argument that the death penalty violates international law. See, e.g., 
People v. Adams, 336 P.3d 1223, 1252 (Cal. 2014). Remarkably, only two state court opinions 
since Sosa—a period of more than a decade—contain even a brief discussion of custom. See 
Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84, 108–12 (Conn. 2012) (concluding that force-feeding 
an inmate for reasons of medical necessity does not violate CIL); In re Guardianship of Mark C.H., 
906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 n.49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (noting that the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties codifies pre-existing CIL). This shows that, as a practical matter, judicial efforts to 
ascertain CIL are essentially exclusive to the federal courts in contemporary litigation. Cf. generally 
Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2001) (discussing 
the historical role of state courts in the development of CIL). 
44. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
45.  Id. at 725.
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under this new instruction to be more exacting in their evaluation of custom. 
Of course, CIL questions also arise outside of the ATS context with which Sosa 
was concerned, but ATS cases give rise to the majority of CIL analysis, and 
courts have cited the decision as instructive in other types of litigation, both 
civil and criminal.46 Moreover, Sosa aside, the advancement of international 
connectivity over the past decade should have made the task of collecting 
evidence of CIL easier in recent years than at any other point in U.S. history.47 
If the federal courts do not engage in thorough analyses of foreign state 
practice and opinio juris even now, we might reasonably assume that earlier 
opinions exhibited the same tendency to a greater degree.48 
With the initial search results assembled, I proceeded to subtract any 
irrelevant or invalidated hits. I discarded all opinions that mentioned CIL 
without analyzing a customary norm. I also discarded opinions that reached a 
conclusion about CIL solely on the basis of binding precedent, the logic being 
that such decisions reveal little about how judges ascertain custom when 
forced to undertake their own research and analysis. Finally, I discarded all 
opinions that have been vacated, reversed due to flawed CIL reasoning, 
abrogated, or withdrawn. Approximately 120 opinions remained.49 
The next step was to develop a coding strategy for what was left. My 
approach was to identify each conclusion about a customary norm, and then 
categorize by source type and nationality each citation made en route to that 
conclusion. This line of attack reflected a number of strategic choices. First, I 
coded and aggregated citations separately for each CIL conclusion within an 
opinion rather than treat each opinion as an undifferentiated whole, on the 
assumption that the additional granularity would be more revealing. Imagine, 
for example, that an opinion contains two separate conclusions—one 
concerning an alleged norm prohibiting material support for terrorism and 
another on child labor. A study that treated the whole opinion as a single unit 
would not only gloss over potentially significant differences in the quality of 
treatment for each issue, it would also complicate the task of identifying any 
norm-specific trends in the case law. 
46.  See, e.g., Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 676 (7th Cir. 2012) (FSIA);
Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Military Commissions Act); 
United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 626–27 (E.D. Va. 2010) (piracy prosecution). 
47.  See Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating
and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 58 (2011) (“Internet and publishing 
developments are . . . making domestic judgments on international law matters more 
accessible.”). 
48.  Cf. Bederman, supra note 28, at 109 (“[N]otably absent in the post–Civil War Supreme
Court’s handling of customary international law is any direct evidence of the actual practice of states.”). 
49. The reduction from roughly 700 to only 120 was primarily a product of the over-
inclusiveness of the initial search terms. For example, nearly 60 of the 700 were opinions that 
cited to precedent involving a company named International Custom Products. None of these 
opinions had anything to do with CIL, but they turned up in the search results because of the 
company’s name. 
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Second, by focusing on citations, I gave no credit for non-cited sources 
even if an opinion implied that a judge had considered them. As a result, the 
data understate the volume and variety of evidence that courts examined.50 
But the choice is defensible. As a practical matter, it was difficult to identify 
sources with precision when courts referred to them only vaguely, and 
guessing would have created a reliability problem. Cited sources tend to be 
more influential to courts and parties for the reasons stated above.51 And the 
problem of references to non-cited materials was relatively uncommon. It is 
safe to say that the results reflect a clear majority of the sources that directly 
informed the judicial analysis, and probably all of the most influential sources. 
Third, I coded for citations made en route to each CIL conclusion, rather 
than citations that judges relied upon to justify each conclusion. This choice 
means that I counted not only supporting citations, but also citations to 
sources that courts found unpersuasive or otherwise distinguished or rejected. 
A narrower focus might also yield intriguing results, particularly for future 
litigants who want to know which types of authority courts find most 
persuasive. My approach, however, offers a more reliable commentary on the 
quality and capacity of judicial analysis—limiting the inquiry to sources that 
judges relied upon could substantially underreport the rigor of any opinion 
that conscientiously rejected proffered evidence of CIL or its absence. 
Fourth, I counted a citation only once regardless of how many times a 
judge might have repeated it in relation to a particular CIL conclusion. This 
practice differs from that of other citation studies52 and makes it difficult to 
identify the particular sources that were most influential in any given decision. 
At the same time, it is sufficient for a project focused on the evaluation of 
source types and nationalities. It is consistent, moreover, with the notion that 
the quality of an analysis substantially depends on the extent to which it has 
identified evidence of “a general and consistent practice of states”53—i.e., the 
idea that the diversity of sources matters at least as much as the varying depths 
of their treatment. 
As the last component of the coding strategy, I excluded citations that 
appeared unrelated to the specific norms in question. For example, the 
results do not include citations made in the course of general explanations of 
how CIL works and is found, such as the Restatement (Third)’s discussion on 
the types of state practice on which custom might rest.54 Nor do they include 
50.  Cf. David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 310 (2006) (“Underinclusivity is . . . likely because judges are 
conservative citers, in that they may rely on, but not cite to, foreign authority that they find 
persuasive.”). 
51.  See supra text accompanying note 41.
52.  See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 50, at 311 (counting each time an opinion cited a foreign
court).  
53.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
54.  See id. § 102 cmt. b.
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citations made to explain the relationship between CIL and domestic law, 
such as citations to the Sosa opinion.55 
Having settled upon this approach, the final step was to organize and 
record the results. I identified four categories of citations and divided them 
into 15 subcategories: 
A) Foreign Citations: (1) direct evidence of foreign state practice,
such as foreign judicial decisions, statutes, constitutional provisions, 
and the like, plus the name of the originating state; 
B) Delegation Citations: (2) law review articles, books, and treatises;
(3) amicus briefs and expert declarations; and (4) NGO reports, 
plus the nationality56 of the author(s) for each citation; 
C) Multilateral Citations: (5) multilateral57 treaties that the United
States has ratified;58 (6) multilateral treaties that the United States 
has not ratified; (7) UN Security Council resolutions; (8) UN 
General Assembly resolutions; (9) opinions from international 
courts; (10) UN reports; and (11) official documents of any kind 
from any other international organization; 
D) Domestic Citations: (12) federal statutes; (13) federal and state
judicial opinions; (14) statements and reports from Congress; and 
(15) statements, reports, and regulations from the Executive 
Branch. 
I recognize that the application of these rules entails an element of 
judgment that may complicate efforts to replicate the results. This is a 
common problem in citation-count studies.59 To minimize it and ensure 
internal consistency, I separately coded the opinions twice and harmonized 
55. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
56. I defined nationality as the country in which the author received his or her first law
degree, which was typically a J.D. or an LLB. I did this on the assumption that the site of an 
academic’s legal education exerts substantial influence on his or her legal perspectives. See Ryan 
M. Scoville, International Law in National Schools, 92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that 
distinctive national approaches to international legal education socialize law graduates to view 
international law in different ways). In addition, I counted the nationality of co-authors and thus 
coded some sources as having multiple nationalities. 
57. I coded treaties as multilateral if they had more than five parties, and as the foreign
state practice of each individual party if they had five or fewer. The line is somewhat arbitrary, 
but enabled me to credit individual states where their influence was most significant. 
58. The numbers reported throughout this Article operate on the premise that U.S. treaties
are multilateral sources, given the large number of states that often join, but coding them as 
domestic sources would also be sensible in light of the Supremacy Clause. See Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 599, 601–02 (2008) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be the 
‘[S]upreme Law of the Land,’ just as the Constitution and federal statutes are, and instructs 
judges to give them effect.”). 
59.  See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 50, at 311 (mentioning potential reader disagreements with
some of his coding decisions). 
1904  IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1893 
the results. Moreover, most coding decisions did not present close questions, 
so other researchers are likely to find the same basic trends even if they 
disagree with some of the decisions I have made. 
III. CONTEXT
Questions about custom tend to arise in certain types of cases. To identify 
those types, I collected information for each CIL conclusion on the name of 
the authoring court, publication year, case type, topic, defendant type, and 
geographic location of the alleged conduct. I also noted whether the judge 
held in favor of or against the existence of the norm in question. This 
information provides context for the citation data that follows and illuminates 
the stakes, both for the parties and U.S. foreign relations. 
A number of contextual features stand out. First, judges are generally 
amenable to finding custom: 76% of the analyses yielded an affirmative 
conclusion about the existence of a norm. The percentage in criminal cases 
(83%) was slightly higher than it was in civil cases (75%), and within the latter 
grouping the numbers ranged from 100% for decisions under the FSIA to 
73% under the ATS and 71% for habeas. The variation likely reflects the types 
of norms that these cases implicated. Criminal cases often raised questions 
about norms on extraterritorial jurisdiction that are, for the most part, 
domestically uncontroversial.60 Civil litigation, by contrast, typically involved 
claims based on human rights norms, some of which are contested.61 Yet the 
habeas and ATS percentages are still quite high and suggest that courts are 
not hostile toward CIL per se even post-Sosa.62 
       Second, there is an uneven distribution of CIL conclusions among the 
circuits, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Jurisdictions containing a number of 
the largest and perhaps the most cosmopolitan urban centers—specifically, 
the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—generated the largest volume of 
conclusions, with the Second Circuit being the clear leader among the group. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
hardly ever addressed questions about custom. If this pattern also extends 
back into the pre-Sosa cases, we might reasonably anticipate differences in the 
comfort and skill with which judges in the various circuits go about 
ascertaining CIL. 
60.  See, e.g., United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883–85 (C.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing
norms on extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction). 
61.  See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021–24 (7th Cir. 2011)
(concluding that CIL does not prohibit child labor); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 
1004 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting an ATS claim based on environmental destruction).  
62.  Cf. Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 
1078–83 (2015) (finding that federal opinions “do not reflect a hostility toward or an unwillingness to 
engage international law qua international law” in the context of human rights litigation). 
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Figure 1. Post-Sosa CIL Conclusions by Circuit 
       Third, there is an uneven distribution of conclusions among the various 
categories of cases. As shown in Figure 2, a clear majority (68%) occurred in 
ATS litigation, followed by all non-MDLEA criminal cases (11%), FSIA cases 
(6%), residual civil cases (6%), habeas (5%), and MDLEA cases (4%). This 
distribution highlights the significance of the recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, where the Supreme Court dismissed an ATS claim for alleged 
violations of CIL that occurred abroad, on the reasoning that the statute 
provides jurisdiction only for “claims [that] touch and concern the territory 
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against [the] extraterritorial application” of U.S. law.63 By all accounts, Kiobel 
dealt a serious blow to many who might hope to use ATS jurisdiction as a path 
to redress,64 and in the wake of the decision lower courts have dismissed a 
significant number of claims concerning foreign conduct.65 Because Kiobel’s 
focus on territorial nexus does not require an analysis of CIL, the long-term 
effect of the decision is likely to be a significant reduction in the application 
of custom in federal court. Depending in part on one’s view of the results 
below,66 this may or may not be a positive development. 
63. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
64.  See Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-
Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1062–65 (2015) (discussing how Kiobel “limit[ed] 
the ATS even more sharply”); see also Kenny, supra note 62, at 1109 (finding that, post-Kiobel, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been “by far the most prominent ground invoked in 
dismissing” claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act).  
65.  See, e.g., Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 48–50 (2d Cir.
2014) (dismissing a claim for torture that allegedly occurred in Bangladesh); Mujica v. AirScan 
Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591–96 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing claims based on conduct that allegedly 
occurred in Colombia). 
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Figure 2. Post-Sosa CIL Conclusions by Case Type 
       Other aspects of the context are also important. Figure 3 shows the topics 
that generated the largest number of conclusions, with aiding and abetting 
liability; prescriptive jurisdiction; torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment; and corporate liability constituting the five that arose with the 
greatest frequency. Figure 4 identifies the most common categories of 
defendants in these cases—corporations, foreign nationals, U.S. nationals, 
foreign officials, and foreign governments. Figure 5 in turn reveals the 
geography of the acts that gave rise to the collected cases. A relatively large 
number of conclusions implicated conduct that occurred in international 
waters—a reflection of piracy cases, both civil and criminal, and convictions 
under the MDLEA, which federal authorities have relied upon to combat drug 
trafficking. Otherwise, CIL conclusions typically concerned the legality of acts 
that occurred at least partly in the developing world. 
Figure 3. Post-Sosa CIL Conclusions by Issue Volume 
Alien Tort Statute (68%)
Non-MDLEA Criminal (11%)
Civil (Other) (6%)
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
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Figure 4. Post-Sosa CIL Conclusions by Defendant Type 
Figure 5. Post-Sosa CIL Conclusions by Site of Conduct 
        Together, these figures confirm a common impression about CIL 
litigation in federal courts—namely, these are typically not domestic disputes 
with merely coincidental international elements, but rather international 
disputes that happen to be in domestic court. Thus the stakes: because the 
cases often involve foreign defendants and at least an element of 
extraterritorial conduct, the quality of the analysis will often carry foreign 
policy consequences. And because many of the parties affected are either 
criminal defendants or alleged victims of serious human rights abuses, there 
is a real imperative for careful research and reasoning. The next task is to 
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IV. RESULTS
        This Part reports the study results.67 I begin by discussing findings 
concerning the quality of CIL analysis in the courts and then proceed to 
identify three salient trends of parochialism, multilateralism, and delegation. 
For each of these, I provide data and hypothesize on contributing influences. 
A. QUALITY OF ANALYSIS 
       The data support a number of conclusions about the quality of judicial 
analysis, as measured by citation count. First, quality varied by jurisdiction. In 
general, courts ascertained CIL on the basis of relatively few authorities of any 
kind. The cases cited an average of slightly less than eight (7.8) and a median 
of five different sources per conclusion. Yet the numbers for some courts were 
noticeably higher. Appellate courts averaged nearly ten (9.9) sources per 
conclusion—quite a bit more than the district courts (6.5). Moreover, the 
appellate courts that handled the largest volume of CIL questions had a 
tendency to engage in the most thorough analyses, as shown below in Figure 
6. This particular result is consistent with the possibility that courts familiar
with CIL claims are more willing and able to perform a full, thorough analysis, 
although it might also indicate a tendency among lawyers who practice before 
certain courts to provide more substantial briefing on these issues. 
Figure 6. Average Number of Sources Cited Per CIL Conclusion in Federal 
Appellate Opinions 
       Second, quality of analysis varied moderately among the different types 
of cases. As shown below, opinions in ATS cases exhibited the highest average 
number of sources cited per conclusion (8.4). Criminal cases had the second-
highest average (7.3), followed by FSIA (6.6), habeas (6.2), and other civil 
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cases (4.5). Yet criminal and FSIA cases had the highest medians of 6.5 and 
5.5, respectively. Observers might reasonably react to these numbers in 
different ways. On the one hand, the high average for the ATS, particularly in 
comparison to other civil cases, is consistent with Sosa’s instruction for lower 
courts to scrutinize ATS claims,68 and the high median in criminal cases is 
comforting if one believes in a need for particularly careful research and 
analysis where personal liberty is at stake. On the other hand, some might 
have expected an even bigger difference between the criminal and civil cases. 
A significant number of opinions from the criminal context were comparable 
to or even less rigorous than those of the civil variety.69 
Figure 7. Sources Cited Per CIL Conclusion by Case Type 
B. PAROCHIALISM 
        Moving from citation volume to type, the most conspicuous pattern is 
that of parochialism: the opinions focused extensively on American practices 
and perspectives.70 Among the four categories, domestic citations were by far 
the most common, making up nearly half (48%) of all citations in the data 
68. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–31 (2004).
69.  See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394, 415 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing
one opinion from a federal district court for the proposition that the Article I Offenses Clause 
provides constitutional authority for Congress to proscribe material support for terrorism). 
70.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308–09 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
exclusively to non-binding precedents from other federal courts in identifying the contours of 
the protective principle under CIL); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 
582–85 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing to non-binding precedent from other federal courts, U.S. treaties, 
a federal statute, and a report from the executive branch in concluding that war crimes do not 
require state action under CIL). One scholar has described this practice as “methodological 
provincialism.” See Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
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set.71 As shown in Figure 8, multilateral (28%), delegation (19%), and foreign 
(4%) citations trailed far behind. Figures 9 and 10 accentuate the point by 
reporting the number of citations to official government sources from the 
most-cited countries. These show that an overwhelming 89% of national 
government sources were attributable to the U.S. government, followed by the 
British (3%), Russian (2%), and French (2%) governments. Citations to 
government sources from all countries in Africa, Asia, Central America, the 
rest of Europe, Oceania, and South America made up a combined total of 
only 32% of foreign government sources and 4% of all national government 
sources.72 And the focus on U.S. authority was even more pronounced than 
these numbers suggest—a clear majority of the direct citations to British, 
French, and Russian state practice concerned actions undertaken jointly with 
the United States in the immediate aftermath of World War II, such as the 
enactments of the Allied Control Council.73 If one were to remove those from 
the tabulation, citations to official sources from all foreign governments 
combined would constitute only 5% of national government sources. From 
this perspective, U.S. government authorities exerted overwhelming and 
nearly exclusive influence on federal judicial analysis of CIL. 
71. If one were to code ratified treaties as domestic sources rather than multilateral sources
in light of the Supremacy Clause, the percentage of all citations falling into the category of 
domestic citations would rise to 55%, while the percentage falling into the category of 
multilateral citations would fall to 21%. 
72.  See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing an Israeli judicial opinion);
United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 159, 168 n.2 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing a Somalian presidential 
proclamation and submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (citing
statements from the South African government); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1222–23 n.11 
(9th Cir. 2005) (citing provisions in the Israeli penal code and the constitutions of Argentina, 
Brazil, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, and Thailand); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort 
Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1319 & n.14–17 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(citing treaty declarations by Bahrain, Brazil, China, Egypt, Guatemala, Syria, Thailand, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam); WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 
368–70 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing an Australian patent statute and a South African judicial 
opinion); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 618 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing a Kenyan 
criminal statute and judicial opinion); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 282 n.28 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing treaty declarations by Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Syria); Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing an 
opinion from the Federal Court of Australia).  
73.  See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 200 (2d Cir. 2009) (Wesley, J.,
dissenting) (citing enactments of the Allied Control Council); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 
99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455752, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (same). 
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Figure 8. Post-Sosa Citations by Category74 
Figure 9. Citations to National Government Sources by Country 
74. The percentage of the total volume of citations associated with each subcategory was as
follows: federal judicial opinions (41%); academic articles, books, and treatises (19%); opinions 
from international courts (8%); U.S. treaties (7%); treaties not ratified by the United States 
(5%); foreign state practice (4%); sources from the executive branch (4%); resolutions of the 
U.N. Security Council (3%); U.S. statutes (2%); U.N. reports (2%); amicus briefs (1%); sources 
from the legislative branch (1%); resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly (<1%); sources from 
other international organizations (<1%); and NGO materials (<1%). As explained earlier, if one 
were to code ratified treaties as domestic sources rather than multilateral sources in light of the 
Supremacy Clause, the percentage of all citations falling into the category of domestic citations 
would rise to 55%, while the percentage falling into the category of multilateral citations would 
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Figure 10. Citations to Foreign Government Sources by Country 
       Within the national government sources, certain types of authority 
appeared more often than others. By far the most frequently cited U.S. 
authority was non-binding federal judicial precedent, which made up 85% of 
all domestic citations.75 References to executive branch reports and 
statements (8%), federal statutes (5%), and legislative reports and statements 
(2%) were relatively uncommon, and references to the practices of the fifty 
states were non-existent. In contrast, treaty participation was the most 
commonly used direct evidence of foreign state practice (64%), followed by 
foreign judicial decisions (18%), constitutional provisions (9%), treaty 
reservations (4%), statutes (4%), and diplomatic statements (1%). Figures 11 
and 12 display these results. 
75.  Cf. Szewczyk, supra note 29, at 1133 (reporting that, in statutory interpretation cases,
“[t]he predominant source [of CIL] was federal case law, which was referenced in all instances 
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Figure 11. U.S. Government Sources by Type
Figure 12. Foreign Government Sources by Type 
        Courts also used foreign and U.S. government sources in different ways. 
The former usually operated as evidence of state practice.76 In contrast, courts 
often employed domestic authorities not as evidence of state practice or opinio 
juris per se, but instead as persuasive evidence regarding the propriety of a 
particular conclusion about a contested norm.77 To put the distinction in the 
76.  See, e.g., Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1222 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “torture is
illegal under the law of virtually every country in the world” and citing the laws of Argentina, 
Brazil, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Russia, and Thailand as support). 
77.  See, e.g., Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belgium, 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239–40,
242 (E.D. Va. 2012) (citing a series of nonbinding federal precedents for the proposition that 
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language of international law, courts were more likely to apply U.S. 
government sources—mostly case law, but occasionally statutes and executive 
actions as well78—as a “subsidiary means for the determination” of custom.79 
This is intriguing in part because it is hard to reconcile with the traditional 
doctrine of sources, which identifies “judicial decisions” as the only 
government source that can serve as a subsidiary means.80 But it is also 
noteworthy because the tendency to use domestic authorities in this way 
substantially empowers them.81 Rather than view a federal case or statute as a 
single point in a global constellation of national practices, courts often relied 
on domestic authorities as reliable and independently sufficient evidence of 
an international norm. 
        Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC provides an extreme but not uncommon example. 
There, residents of Papua New Guinea sued Rio Tinto for violating an alleged 
norm against environmental degradation in the course of mining operations 
on the island of Bougainville,82 but the court dismissed the claim as “based on 
international law norms that have not, as yet, achieved the status of matters of 
‘universal concern.’”83 The court did not cite any foreign or international 
sources for support.84 Instead, it relied exclusively upon decisions from the 
Second and Fifth Circuits and a collection of precedent from other district 
courts.85 Implicitly, these cases were deemed to reflect not simply the practice 
or position of the United States, but evidence of a general and consistent 
global practice backed by opinio juris. 
       A number of factors may explain the case law’s inward orientation. 
Perhaps the most likely and significant is the vexing logistical challenge of 
locating, collecting, and evaluating direct evidence of the practices and views 
of numerous foreign states. This challenge would have two consequences: 
First, it would make it difficult for the parties—particularly those who are cost-
sensitive—to supply the courts with relevant foreign authorities in their 
government expropriation of the property of its own nationals is not a violation of international 
law, without discussing the requirements of state practice and opinio juris). 
78.  See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 634–35 (E.D. Va. 2010) (concluding
that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea represents CIL and citing presidential statements 
as support); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing the 
Torture Victim Protection Act’s legislative history for the proposition that torture violates CIL). 
79. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993. 
80.  Id. In this sense, there is a tension between the international law doctrine of sources
and the traditional tendency for federal courts to look to the political branches whenever possible 
in cases that implicate foreign affairs.  
81.  Cf. Roberts, supra note 47, at 63 (“[N]ational court decisions are often given greater
weight than the practice of a single State would suggest because they are treated as a subsidiary 
means of identifying international law rather than as State practice per se.”); see also Roger 
O’Keefe, Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of the International Law of Jurisdiction, 26 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 541, 557 (2013) (making a similar point). 
82. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1006–07, 1024–26 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
83.  Id. at 1025.
84.  See id. at 1024–25.
85.  Id. at 1024–26.
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briefing.86 Second, it would limit courts’ ability to undertake independent 
research. On this view, courts and parties focus on U.S. government sources 
simply because it is the convenient thing to do; domestic authorities are 
readily available and require no translation or knowledge of foreign legal 
systems. 
        But logistics is probably not the only explanation. Some courts might cite 
fewer foreign official sources due to discomfort with the idea that foreign 
governments influence the content of substantive law in the United States.87 
Often lacking in international legal training,88 American lawyers and judges 
might not understand what CIL entails.89 A strong national orientation might 
also reflect judicial habit; perhaps judges cite to federal precedent more 
frequently than other sources because that is an ingrained element of legal 
analysis. Or lower courts might simply be following the example of Sosa, where 
the majority did not cite any foreign government sources in the course of 
concluding that CIL fails to prohibit executive detention in excess of a state’s 
domestic legal authority.90 
        Social psychology might also play an intriguing role. Researchers have 
demonstrated that individuals have a tendency to assume that others share 
their opinions, values, and habits, and that this bias generates a perception of 
consensus even when consensus does not exist.91 Known as the false-consensus 
86. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the briefing tends to focus on U.S. government
sources. See, e.g., Brief of the Appellant Yimmi Bellaizac-Hurtado, United States v. Bellaizac-
Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 14049-HH) (citing no direct evidence of foreign 
state practice or opinio juris); Brief for the United States, United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 
F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 14049-HH) (same); Reply Brief of the Appellant Yimmi 
Bellaizac-Hurtado, United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 
14049-HH) (same). 
87.  Cf. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short
Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 845 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court has a “continuing, 
seemingly visceral resistance to treating modern international law in both treaty and customary 
form as law of the United States”).  
88.  See Coyle, supra note 31, at 468 (reporting that no state bar exam tests international law
and that the Federal Judicial Center’s training program for new federal judges does not cover 
international law); United States, PIL MAP (2015), http://pilmap.org/Details/US (reporting that 
only 4% of U.S. law schools require students to complete a course on international law). 
89.  See Wilson, supra note 25, at 897 (discussing how “American legal education fails to
systemically equip future judges and attorneys to conduct research on foreign law,” and how 
“judges and their law clerks may receive only limited exposure to international law or 
transnational legal matters during their law school studies”); see also Flomo v. Firestone Nat. 
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he relevant evidence of customary 
international law is widely dispersed and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.”). 
90.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–38 (2004). But see id. at 762 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citing a decision from the Supreme Court of Israel on the principal of universal 
jurisdiction). 
91.  See generally Gary Marks & Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus
Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72 (1987) (discussing the 
accumulated evidence on the effect); Lee Ross et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias 
in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977) 
(identifying the effect). 
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effect, the phenomenon occurs in a variety of social settings and has several 
empirically grounded explanations. One is selective exposure: because people 
tend to associate with individuals who are similar to themselves, they are more 
likely to encounter agreement than disagreement, and they extrapolate from 
that unrepresentative sample of experiences to anticipate the views of 
others.92 Another explanation emphasizes that the false-consensus effect can 
be logical insofar as people attribute their behavior to situational forces that 
others also encounter.93 Finally, some have found that the effect occurs 
because we derive functional value from perceiving similarity between self and 
others.94 A perception of similarity “may bolster perceived social support, 
validate the correctness or appropriateness of a position, maintain self-
esteem, maintain or restore cognitive balance, or reduce tension associated 
with anticipated social interaction.”95 
        As applied to judicial analyses of CIL, the false-consensus effect may 
contribute to parochialism by excusing the failure to rigorously examine 
foreign state practice and opinio juris. The subconscious projection of familiar, 
American views onto an external world, in other words, would substantially 
obviate the need to canvas the foreign by assimilating it to the domestic. This 
might occur for any number of reasons. Judges, for one, are steeped in 
national legal culture and interact primarily with American lawyers who not 
only share their professional socialization, but also actively appeal to, and thus 
reinforce, the culture’s dominant sensibilities in order to prevail.96 This is 
helpful for the maintenance of domestic legal order, but it also amounts to a 
form of selective exposure that probably encourages the imputation of 
universality to what may be American idiosyncrasy. Standard rhetoric about 
America’s hegemonic position in global affairs probably contributes as well; it 
does not take much to go from recognition of the fact of American 
dominance to the conclusion that evidence of U.S. state practices and views 
are both necessary and sufficient to discern the content of custom.97 
Moreover, judges might subconsciously derive value from perceiving global 
consensus. It is comforting to think the rest of the world shares our norms. 
92. Steven J. Sherman et al., The False Consensus Effect in Estimates of Smoking Prevalence:
Underlying Mechanisms, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 197, 200–05 (1983). 
93.  See generally Thomas Gilovich et al., Causal Focus and Estimates of Consensus: An
Examination of the False-Consensus Effect, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 550 (1983). 
94. Marks & Miller, supra note 91, at 72–73.
95.  Id.
96.  Coyle, supra note 31, at 447–50 (arguing that this socialization influences how federal
judges perceive international law). 
97.  Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824,
1853–54 (1998) (“[I]nsofar as customary international law rules arise from traditional State 
practice, the United States has been, for most of this century, the world’s primary maker of and 
participant in this practice.”). 
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C. MULTILATERALISM 
        The second most significant citation pattern is multilateralism. As 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris, courts also cited significant treaties, 
international tribunals, and the work of various international organizations. 
Such sources made up 28% of all citations in the data set—less than domestic 
(48%), but more than delegation (19%) and foreign citations (4%).98 Within 
this collection, references to decisions by international tribunals were the 
most common at 31% of the total. Multilateral treaties that the United States 
has ratified were also common (26%), followed by treaties that the United 
States has not ratified (19%), UN Security Council Resolutions (9%), UN 
Reports (9%), UN General Assembly Resolutions (3%), and publications 
from other international organizations (3%), as shown below in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Citations to Multilateral Sources by Type 
       A relatively small number of sources generated the bulk of the citations 
for some of these subcategories. The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
published a majority of the cited international judicial decisions.99 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the reason for most citations to 
UN General Assembly Resolutions.100 And the statutes for the international 
criminal tribunals were behind most citations to UN Security Council 
Resolutions.101 
98. As indicated earlier, these numbers will be slightly different if one codes on the premise
that ratified treaties are domestic sources rather than multilateral sources. The former would rise 
to 55%, while the latter would fall to 21%. See supra note 71. 
99.  See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 100.  See, e.g., Doe  v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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        The data on multilateral treaties are also significant. Although 
ratification is an important route to treaty formation,102 the results show that 
a treaty’s ratification status in the United States did not carry much 
significance. As depicted in Figure 14, courts cited treaties to which the 
United States is a party only slightly more often than those to which it is not, 
and the cited academic works cited unratified treaties more frequently than 
ratified treaties. Some of these, moreover, were treaties to which the United 
States is also not a signatory103—the Rome Statute104 and European 
Convention on Human Rights105 were among the most-cited, as shown in 
Figure 15. This practice has the effect of partially circumventing the formal 
ratification process;106 while the United States is not bound to the unratified 
treaties as such, the courts treat as binding the CIL that these agreements may 
have played a substantial role in creating.107 
Figure 14. Average Number of Citations to Ratified & Unratified Treaties 
 102.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 14, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 103.  See, e.g., Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 756 (D. Md. 2010) (citing the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 
104.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
President Clinton signed the Statute in 2000. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON, STATEMENT ON THE ROME 
TREATY ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-
2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf. President Bush, however, unsigned the treaty in 2002. 
See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. 
Sec’y Gen. (May 6, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.  
 105.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
Amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 106.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 107.  This is also a practice for which there is historical precedent. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 
28, 50 (1866) (citing the 1856 Declaration of Paris Respecting Maritime Law as evidence of CIL); 
see also Bederman, supra note 28, at 105 (“[T]here appears to be a substantial basis for inferring 
from the Court’s post–Civil War jurisprudence that customary international law rules could be 
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       Also of note is the way in which the opinions discussed unratified treaties. 
Courts typically did not consider whether a decision against ratification might 
constitute a form of persistent objection to the norm in question.108 Nor did 
they typically consider whether treating an agreement as evidence of CIL 
would be appropriate as a matter of international law. Of the opinions that 
cited an unratified treaty, hardly any referred to the International Court of 
Justice’s famous decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, which set forth 
guidelines for deciding whether a treaty has helped to generate custom.109 
While the executive branch has affirmed that some of these agreements codify 
CIL,110 and while judicial deference to the executive branch has been 
common in cases that implicate foreign affairs,111 it was also typical for courts 
not to look to the executive for guidance on an agreement’s CIL 
implications.112 And no courts inquired into treaty compliance. The typical 
approach seems to have assumed either that states comply113 or that the 
expressed intention to comply is sufficient to contribute materially to the 
formation of a norm. 
        Finally, the multilateral sources exhibited varying degrees of attenuation 
to state practice and opinio juris. In many cases, the link to one or the other 
was fairly clear, such as when courts cited resolutions of the UN Security 
Council114 or General Assembly.115 But in other cases it was not. It was not 
altogether uncommon,116 for example, for courts to cite the work of 
 108.  Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 233–39 (2010) (discussing the nature and origins of the persistent objector doctrine).  
 109.  See North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3,  
¶¶ 60–81 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (identifying the clarity and substance of the treaty text, the 
number of ratifications, the time since entry into force, and the uniformity of subsequent state 
practice as factors relevant to whether the treaty has created CIL). Only two cases cited this 
decision and discussed its significance. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 
139 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 633 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also 
Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 176 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J., dissenting) 
(citing the Restatement (Third), which in turn cited the ICJ’s decision). 
 110.  See, e.g., Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634–35 (citing executive branch statements affirming 
that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea codifies CIL in many respects).  
 111.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons 
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1305–17 (1988). But see generally Harlan Grant Cohen, 
Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015) 
(arguing that the Roberts Court has become less deferential to the executive on matters of 
foreign relations law). 
 112.  See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 
2006) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (discussing various international agreements without reference to the 
views of the executive branch on their implications for CIL).  
 113.  This assumption is questionable. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1978 (2002) (reporting evidence that noncompliance with human 
rights treaties is “rampant,” and that “countries with poor human rights ratings are sometimes more 
likely to have ratified the relevant treaties than are countries with better ratings”).  
 114.  See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136.  
 115.  See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
116.  Approximately 11% of the cases cited one or more reports from a UN-affiliated 
organization, some of which were comprised of individuals rather than states. 
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organizations composed of individuals rather than states, such as the Office 
of the Secretary General of the United Nations.117 This practice is significant 
because, while some dissent,118 an influential view holds that international 
organizations cannot contribute to the formation of CIL insofar as their 
actions are not attributable to states,119 and for the most part the executive 
branch seems to agree.120 
        The commonality of judicial citation to multilateral sources might have 
a number of explanations. First, and perhaps most importantly, these 
authorities are readily available; it is easy for parties and courts to access UN 
materials and other similar sources online.121 Second, courts might view 
international treaties and organizations as particularly powerful evidence of 
opinio juris, given the number of states they involve and the clarity with which 
they are capable of addressing contested issues. Finally, lower courts may be 
following the lead of Sosa, which discussed multilateral sources more than any 
other category en route to rejecting the appellant’s claim.122 
 117.  See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 274 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 118.  See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human 
Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 221–27 (1991) (arguing that international organizations and their 
agencies “should . . . hav[e] the ability to create custom” even when they do not represent states 
as members). 
 119.  Sir Michael Wood, International Organizations and Customary International Law, 48 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 609, 618 (2015); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Customary international law results from 
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 120.  See Stephen Townley, Counsellor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 
Remarks at the 69th General Assembly Sixth Committee on Agenda Item 78: Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its 66th Session (Nov. 5, 2014) (transcript 
available at http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6219) (“While we are not persuaded as yet that the 
practice of international organizations is of general relevance to the identification of custom, we 
are open to the possibility that there may be circumstances in which some activities of 
international organizations may contribute to the formation of customary international law.”). 
 121.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org (last visited May 
7, 2016). 
122.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–38 (2004). 
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Figure 15. Total Number of Citations to Unratified Treaties 
D. DELEGATION 
       Lastly, the results demonstrate a pattern of delegation. Courts frequently 
considered books, treatises, law review articles, amicus briefs, and expert 
declarations in the course of adjudicating questions about international 
norms. While this practice certainly occurs elsewhere as well,123 it appears to 
be far more common in the present context—delegation citations comprised 
nearly 20% of all citations in the data set. Yet the utility of this practice largely 
depends on the nature of the underlying sources; careful and inclusive 
academic analyses of U.S. and foreign practice and opinio juris would minimize 
the need for judicial consideration of official state sources, while incomplete, 
nationalistic or otherwise problematic studies could easily operate as a source 
of misunderstanding and error. In this Section, I analyze delegation citations 
from a multi-generational perspective by considering both delegation sources 
that judges cited (“Generation n”) and sources cited within the delegation 
sources (“Generation n–1”). Evaluating the two offers a sense for the utility of 
delegation and the proximate genealogy of custom in domestic court. 
1. Generation n
        These citations displayed a number of characteristics. First, most referred 
to sources that appeared reliable, including many books and articles by 
influential scholars. Only 7% referred to student notes. In this regard, the 
cases were generally consistent with the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, which provides that the teachings of only the “most highly qualified 
 123.  See David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts 
of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1359 (2011) (finding that 7.6% of 
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publicists of the various nations” can serve as subsidiary means for the 
determination of international law.124 
       Second, the citations were substantially concentrated in the sense that 
approximately one-third referred to only a handful of publications. Atop the 
list was the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, which alone accounted for 18% of the delegation cites—more than all 
sources from foreign authors, and more than any other individual source. 
Also influential, although much less so, were M. Cherif Bassiouni (3%), 
Eugene Kontorovich (3%), co-editors Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts 
(3%), and Antonio Cassese (3%), all of whom were cited in a number of cases 
and for a range of propositions. To this extent, one might reasonably assume 
that delegation has been a successful strategy. Indeed, given the serious 
logistical challenges to research in original sources, reliance on respected 
academics who have time to canvas state practice and opinio juris could be the 
single best method for ascertaining CIL. 
       But there are reasons for concern. For one, delegation citations also 
exhibited a strong national and Western orientation. A clear majority (61%) 
referred to works by American authors.125 Otherwise, the most common 
author nationalities were British (13%), German (4%), Swiss (3%), Italian 
(3%), Canadian (2%), Egyptian (2%), Dutch (1%), Ukrainian (1%), and 
Australian (1%), as shown below in Figure 16. These are similar to the 
numbers on government sources insofar as they document the outsized 
influence of the United States and, to a lesser degree, Western Europe. U.S. 
courts never cited a single work by a Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, Pakistani, 
or Russian author. Only 9% of the delegation citations had non-Western 
authors, and many of those individuals have spent substantial time in the 
West.126 
 124.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993. 
 125.  This figure includes citations to the Restatement (Third), which was written with the 
assistance of an international advisory panel but otherwise reflects the work of reporters and 
advisors who were mostly American. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES at V–VII (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 126.  For example, given my coding rules, I designated works by Ved Nanda as having an 
Indian author because he obtained his initial legal education at Delhi University, but he has spent 
more time in American legal academia than I have. See Faculty Profile: Ved P. Nanda, U. DENVER 
STURM C. L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ved-nanda (last visited May 7, 2016). 
Presumably his work also reflects the socializing effects of this professional experience.  
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Figure 16. Post-Sosa Delegation Citations by Author Nationality 
       These sources probably contributed to the nationalist lens through 
which courts understood custom. As Anthea Roberts and others have 
shown,127 there is evidence that communities of international legal scholars 
in different states tend to approach international law with distinctive 
understandings and ideological orientations. Although the causation is 
complex, such variation probably has a lot to do with socialization.128 
Individuals operating in the legal academic culture within a particular state 
typically graduate from the same law schools, acquire a standard set of 
professional experiences before entering academia, read each other’s work, 
and attend the same conferences and workshops, all while interacting 
infrequently with foreign colleagues who, meanwhile, experience their own 
professional socialization in distinctive foreign communities. Moreover, even 
those who remain incompletely socialized must still work within the 
 127.  See generally ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (forthcoming 2016) 
(comparing international law casebooks and academics from Australia, China, France, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States); see also Joost Pauwelyn, Europe, America and the ‘Unity’ of 
International Law, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES 205–25 (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2008) (discussing differences 
between American and European approaches to international law); Scoville, supra note 56, at Part I 
(documenting different national approaches to the study of international law). For an historical 
example of these differences and why they matter, see generally ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: 
BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE GREAT WAR (2014) (exploring how some of 
the key states in World War I approached and understood international humanitarian law in different 
ways, with significant consequences on the battlefield). 
 128.  Cf. Scoville, supra note 56, at Parts II–III (arguing that law schools are capable of 
socializing students to adopt views about international law that law faculties have chosen to 
privilege, and that cross-national variation in the content of privileged views might explain 
varying rates of state compliance with international norms). Influences other than socialization, 
such as the structure of the contemporary international order, might also play a role. See William 
W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 
56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 25–47 (2015) (arguing that structural features of the current international 
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predominant stylistic, doctrinal, and theoretical paradigms in order to appeal 
to their national colleagues. To report that courts cite most frequently to 
American authors, then, is to suggest that the courts often obtain their 
understanding of CIL in substantial part from individuals who have, quite 
plausibly, conveyed distinctly American views.129 
        A second reason for concern is that, although framed as relevant to 
questions about CIL, many delegation citations did not refer to academic 
sources for propositions about state practice or opinio juris. As an example, 
consider the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo v. Firestone National Rubber Co., 
where the question was whether CIL provides for corporate liability for 
violations of international norms.130 Rejecting precedent from the Second 
Circuit as unpersuasive, the panel referred to a variety of federal case law, 
multilateral treaties, and books and law review articles en route to concluding 
that corporate actors can be held liable.131 The number and diversity of 
sources suggests a reliable conclusion, but at least half of the academic 
publications had no direct bearing on CIL. A citation to a book chapter by 
Robert Cryer established simply that “[t]he first international tribunal was the 
Nuremberg IMT [International Military Tribunal] which sat between 1945 
and 1946 to prosecute high-ranking Nazis.”132 A citation to an article by John 
Coffee offered a rationale for the criminal punishment of corporations under 
domestic law.133 And so forth. Courts, in other words, relied on academics for 
a variety of propositions, some of which were quite tangential to the core task 
of identifying a norm. By my count, nearly half (45%) of the delegation 
citations did not even purport to identify or reflect state practice and opinio 
juris. To this extent, the academic sources were less helpful than one might 
imagine. 
2. Generation n–1
       Despite the foregoing issues, we might nevertheless credit delegation as 
a useful strategy if the portion of cited academics who made representations 
about CIL did so on the basis of rigorous and inclusive studies of state practice 
and opinio juris. To determine whether they did, I conducted a separate 
analysis of the sources cited within the cited academic sources. 
       This segment of the study generally followed the same parameters I 
applied to the case law. Specifically, I identified the academic works that both 
contained and were cited for a proposition about contemporary CIL, and 
then coded for the citations the author made with regard to that proposition. 
 129.  Cf. Roberts, supra note 47, at 76 (suggesting that the Restatement (Third) “represents a 
particular US perspective on international law”). 
 130.  See generally Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 131.  Id. at 1017–21. 
 132.  Id. at 1017–18 (quoting Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 752, 770–71 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010)). 
 133.  Id. at 1018 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 447–48 
(1981)). 
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Thus, I excluded books and articles cited for other purposes, such as insights 
on the historical law of nations, discussions about current events, or purely 
theoretical or admittedly aspirational arguments about contested norms, and 
within the remaining works I disregarded any citation unrelated to the CIL 
propositions for which courts cited them. To generate a standard measure of 
quality, I also excluded sources in which the author did not attempt to follow 
contemporary citation conventions for legal scholarship. And, as in my survey 
of case law, I focused only on sources published since Sosa. This cut-off date 
helps to focus the inquiry on how authors and citing courts implement 
current understandings of CIL134 and provides a more distinctive sense for the 
state of recent scholarship. It also guarantees that courts and the authors they 
cited have analyzed CIL in the same geopolitical context. This latter point is 
important because the number of states has risen sharply since World War II 
as a result of decolonization135 and ethnic conflict.136 Works published in prior 
decades, particularly pre-1980, would understandably cite to the practices of 
a smaller number of states for the simple reason that fewer states existed.137 
        Operating within this framework, I coded and analyzed the citations 
contained within a collection of more than seventy books, articles, and amicus 
briefs. These citations support several conclusions. First, as measured by 
citation count, the academic sources seemed to offer comparatively rigorous 
analyses (see Figures 17 and 18). On average, the books and articles cited 
more than twice as many different sources per conclusion (16.5) as the 
judicial opinions (7.8), and the amicus briefs cited more than four times as 
many (35). These sources also had higher medians: 28 sources per conclusion 
in the briefs and seven in the books and articles, compared to only five in the 
judicial opinions. The academic sources, moreover, cited direct evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris with greater frequency—while the courts 
averaged only one foreign authority for every three analyses (.33), the books 
and articles averaged three per analysis (3), and the amicus briefs averaged 
nearly eight (7.9). From this perspective, delegation appears to be a useful 
strategy. 
 134.  See generally SCHLÜTTER, supra note 22 (surveying past and recent developments in the 
theory and practice of CIL). 
 135.  See Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945–1999), UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml (last visited May 7, 2016) (listing the states 
that have acquired independence since 1945). 
 136.  Cf. Yahya Sadowski, Ethnic Conflict, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1998, at 12, 12 (“Ethnic 
conflicts have consistently formed the vast majority of wars ever since the epoch of decolonization 
began to sweep the developing countries after 1945.”). 
 137.  See Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, supra note 135. 
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Figure 17. Quality of Analysis by Volume of Cited Sources 
Figure 18. Quality of Analysis by Volume of Citations to Foreign 
Government Sources
       Yet there are again reasons for concern. Like the judicial opinions, most 
books and articles did not attempt to survey direct evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris. Instead, they focused primarily on the work of other 
academics—41% of their citations referred to other scholarly publications. 
Citations to the various forms of official authority, whether domestic, foreign, 
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Figure 19. Citations in Cited Books & Articles, by Category 
        The amicus briefs present a slightly different, but nevertheless consistent, 
picture. Like the books and articles, a clear majority of them did not attempt 
to survey state practice and opinio juris. But two did, and the sample size of 
only 23 briefs was small enough to allow these to substantially affect the 
results. The first brief, by Philip Alston, canvassed an impressive array of 
foreign evidence in support of the proposition that CIL prohibits summary 
execution.138 The second, by Stefan Talmon, marshaled evidence from a 
significant number of governments across Africa, Asia, and Latin America to 
argue that there is insufficient agreement on the meaning of “terrorism” 
under CIL to meet the test set forth in Sosa.139 Without counting these works, 
the briefs cited most frequently to academic books and articles (25%), 
international judicial decisions (16%), treaties to which the United States is 
not a party (10%), U.S. judicial decisions (10%), and treaties to which the 
United States is a party (7%). Upon counting the filings by Alston and 
Talmon, however, the numbers shift to show that amicus briefs cited most 
frequently to foreign state practice and opinio juris (20%), books and articles 
(18%), international judicial decisions (10%), UN reports (10%), and U.S. 
judicial decisions (9%). These results are in Figure 21. 
 138.  Expert Declaration of Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions at 44, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 
F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Nos. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW) (HBP), 01 Civ. 1909 (KMW) (HBP)). 
This was by far the most thorough survey of state practice that I came across in the course of my 
research. 
 139.  Declaration of Stefan Talmon at 6, Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Nos. 04–CV–5564(NG)(VVP) & 05–CV–0388(NG)(VVP)). Interestingly, the 
district court brushed aside this evidence in concluding that there is a CIL prohibition on 
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Figure 20. Citations in Cited Books & Articles, by Subcategory 
Figure 21. Citations in Cited Amicus Briefs, by Subcategory140 
        The citations in Generation n–1 also exhibited a second characteristic: 
the academic publications were substantially parochial in terms of which 
governments they cited. Official U.S. sources such as federal judicial opinions 
and statutes comprised 36% of all citations to national government sources in 
the cited books and articles and 41% in the cited amicus briefs. By 
comparison, the second-most-cited state was the United Kingdom, which 
comprised 14% of the citations to national government sources. Figures 22 
and 23 illustrate these results. Comparing these numbers to the other data 
 140.  Appellate courts did not cite the vast majority of the amicus briefs that were filed. It is 
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above, it becomes apparent that the international law scholarship to which 
judges referred typically exhibited a moderated but nevertheless significant 
degree of the same inward orientation as the judicial opinions. 
Figure 22. Citations to National Government Sources in Cited Books & 
Articles 
Figure 23. Citations to National Government Sources in Cited Amicus Briefs 
        The citations to national government sources were also under-inclusive 
in the sense that books and articles focused overwhelmingly on the advanced 
democracies of the West. In this scholarship, 83% of the national government 
sources documented official acts or statements of Australia, Canada, New 
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by Anthony Aust141 and co-authors Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck,142 authors virtually never cited any government sources from 
any states in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. To put the point more bluntly, 
most of the cited scholars thought it possible to identify CIL without even a 
brief glance at a majority of states.143 
        Amicus briefs exhibited a similar, but somewhat less exclusive, focus on 
the West. In this subcategory, the authors referred to official sources from the 
American, British, Dutch, French, German, and Italian governments, but all 
of these combined were only a little over half of all citations to official state 
sources at 52%. The remaining 48% comprised a long list of one or two 
citations to official sources from non-Western governments all over the world, 
from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. This cosmopolitanism, however, was 
primarily a result of the two outlier briefs from Alston144 and Talmon.145 The 
rest focused exclusively on American and other Western government sources, 
if they used national government sources at all.146 
       Some forms of national authority appeared more frequently than others 
within the academic writing. With respect to U.S. government sources, 
authors referred most frequently to federal judicial decisions (82%), followed 
by executive branch sources (10%), statutes (5%), the Constitution (1%), 
and congressional reports (1%). Judicial decisions were also the most 
common among foreign government sources (61%), followed by statutes 
(24%), treaty participation (10%), and executive or administrative measures 
(5%). Figures 24 and 25 display these results. 
 141.  See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 324–26 (3d ed. 2013). 
 142. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME I: RULES 3–5 (2005). 
143.  This practice appears to predate the period under review. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 
472 (“The practices and attitudes of Japan, China, and the many nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America are virtually ignored in the Western literature.”). 
 144.  See Alston, supra note 138. 
 145.  See Talmon, supra note 139. 
146.  Citations for the other briefs are located in the “Amici” tab of the downloadable data 
set. See Scoville, supra note 67. 
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Figure 24. U.S. Government Sources in Cited Books & Articles 
Figure 25. Foreign Government Sources in Cited Books & Articles 
        Finally, the cited academic sources were substantially parochial in terms 
of the types of scholarship to which they referred. In a familiar pattern, a large 
percentage (40%) of the cited books and articles had American authors, with 
British (15%), German (5%), Italian (4%), and Sri Lankan (4%) authors 
rounding out the top five. The amicus briefs were similar. Figures 26 and 27 
capture these results and show that the academic analyses were only 
moderately more cosmopolitan than the delegation citations in the judicial 
opinions, 61% of which had American authors.147 
 147.  See supra Figure 16. 








Executive or Administrative Measures
(5%)
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Figure 26. Nationality of Authors Cited in Cited Books & Articles 
Figure 27. Nationality of Authors Cited in Cited Amicus Briefs 
        The condition of the cited scholarship may reflect a wide variety of 
influences. First, like judges, legal academics might be unable to overcome 
the logistical challenge of surveying foreign state practices and views. Second, 
the scholarship might reflect ideological considerations: some might 
intentionally deemphasize state practice on the belief that a focus on the 
current order is unduly apologetic of state power,148 particularly regarding 
matters such as human rights, while others might focus on the United States 
and other similar countries on the view that Western norms are superior to 
 148.  Cf. generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (suggesting that a focus on state practice amounts to 
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competing paradigms from other parts of the world. Third, the false-
consensus effect might play a role. Attending conferences and sharing papers 
with other like-minded individuals from a small handful of states, some may 
view certain norms as uncontroversial and established even while a more 
global perspective could suggest otherwise. 
       It is possible to reject at least one of these, however: the ideological 
explanation appears to be unpersuasive insofar as the phenomenon of 
parochialism extends beyond analyses of human rights norms. Even upon 
limiting the data to scholarship on issues such as extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and the definition of piracy, the cited authors still exhibited a marked 
tendency not to survey state practice or opinio juris, and to focus on the United 
States and Western Europe when conducting such surveys. In non-human 
rights cases, citations to U.S. government sources were as common (14%) as 
citations to sources from all foreign governments combined (14%), as shown 
in the figures below. Moreover, a majority (55%) of the foreign citations 
referred to sources from the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and a 
small number of European states. And of the cited authors, 35% were 
American and 87% from the West. It is clear, in other words, that 
parochialism is a cross-topical phenomenon. 
Figure 28. Citations in Cited Books & Articles on Issues Other than Human 
Rights, by Source Type 
Books & Articles (46%)
US Courts (14%)
Foreign State Practice (14%)
Int'l Courts (9%)




UN Security Council (1%)
UN General Assembly (1%)
Other (2%)
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Figure 29. Citations to Foreign Government Sources in Cited Books & 
Articles on Issues Other than Human Rights
Figure 30. Nationality of Authors Cited in Cited Books & Articles on Issues 
Other than Human Rights
V. IMPLICATIONS 
       To recap, contemporary analyses of CIL in federal court reveal several 
noteworthy patterns. First, although the numbers varied by jurisdiction and 
case-type, courts reached conclusions about custom on the basis of relatively 
few sources. The typical opinion reflected an extremely limited sample of state 
practice and opinio juris, rather than an expansive global survey. Second, the 
limited sample typically had a decidedly parochial orientation. Courts 
frequently cited official U.S. sources, occasionally cited sources from other 
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from any other governments. Third, although less common than the use of 
U.S. government sources, courts often cited multilateral authorities, such as 
treaties and international judicial decisions. Finally, courts partially delegated 
the task of ascertaining CIL by considering, with unusual frequency, academic 
sources such as law review articles. Nearly half of the cited academic works, 
however, did not purport to identify CIL, and most of those that did made 
representations about CIL without conducting broad surveys of state practice 
and opinio juris. Most were written by American academics who cited most 
frequently to other academics, most of whom were Americans or others from 
the West. To the limited extent that these individuals considered direct 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris, they focused on the United States 
and, to a much lesser degree, other similar countries of the West. The 
practices of most states and the views of most foreign scholars were simply 
never considered. These findings have a number of important domestic and 
international implications for courts, practitioners, and scholars. 
A. DISUSE OF THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE 
        First, and perhaps most obviously, federal courts have not followed the 
traditional doctrine. The typical opinion neither demands evidence that a 
state practice is truly “general and consistent,” nor assesses the motivation for 
that practice, nor pays any particular attention to its duration. CIL, according 
to actual federal practice, depends more on the laws and policies of the 
United States than those of the international community as a whole. 
Moreover, in relying primarily upon non-binding federal precedent to 
identify norms, U.S. courts act in tension with the international doctrine that 
the decisions of national courts are, at most, “subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”149 The typical approach has elevated a 
subsidiary means into the principal means. 
       This is not to say that the focus on domestic authorities necessarily yields 
conclusions that are erroneous under the traditional doctrine. The political 
branches have substantial resources with which to investigate thoroughly and 
report on the content of CIL.150 As the most influential state in the 
contemporary order, U.S. practice may ultimately constitute a fairly reliable 
indicator of global norms.151 The sociological phenomenon of cross-national 
institutional isomorphism suggests that the practices of one state might serve 
 149.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993. The effect of this doctrine is to establish that the decisions of municipal courts, 
much like academic publications, can help one to identify CIL but cannot operate as a source of 
CIL. See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as 
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979, 992–93 (2011). 
 150.  Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (describing Congress’s 
expansive powers of investigation). 
 151.  Cf. Koh, supra note 97, at 1853–54 (“[I]nsofar as customary international law rules arise 
from traditional State practice, the United States has been, for most of this century, the world’s 
primary maker of and participant in this practice.”).  
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as reliable clues about the behavior of others.152 And the focus on domestic 
authority was not exclusive; courts also used multilateral and academic 
sources. 
       Yet the common method would seem to carry a non-trivial risk of error. 
Many U.S. government sources do not reflect rigorous examinations of state 
practice and opinio juris. The study results suggest that non-binding federal 
judicial precedents—by far the most common official source—often exhibit 
the same parochialism as the citing opinions.153 Moreover, while the political 
branches are capable of conducting more cosmopolitan and exhaustive 
inquiries, there are no studies on how Congress and the executive branch go 
about ascertaining custom, and, in any event, courts rarely cited U.S. 
government authorities other than judicial opinions. References to executive 
sources comprised only 4% of all citations, while references to statutes (2%) 
and other legislative sources (1%) were even less common.154 Academic 
publications were also of little help; most had Western authors who chose not 
to survey state practice and opinio juris in any sort of inclusive way. If courts 
have reached conclusions about CIL that are correct under the traditional 
doctrine, they have likely done so either coincidentally, with critical assistance 
from multilateral sources, or on the basis of an intergenerational game of 
telephone, whereby judges rely on the potentially distortionary say-so of 
domestic precedent that in turn relied on representations in older domestic 
precedent. 
       Many scholars and practitioners are of course comfortable with the idea 
that CIL has certain definite features—a norm of diplomatic immunity, a 
prohibition on piracy, an allowance for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the 
absence of a general rule against environmental degradation, to name just a 
few. And for the most part, the judicial decisions were consistent with those 
ideas. Courts, for example, consistently concluded that CIL permits 
governments to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the protective 
 152.  Cf. David Strang & John W. Meyer, Institutional Conditions for Diffusion, 22 THEORY & 
SOC’Y 487, 491–92 (1993) (theorizing on how modernity contributes to institutional 
isomorphism on a global scale); see also Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers 
of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 
INT’L ORG. 565 (1993) (identifying international organizations as a source of isomorphism 
among national governments). 
 153.  The evidence for this is anecdotal. See, e.g., William v. AES Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 553, 566 
(E.D. Va. 2014) (rejecting a claim that the provision of substandard electrical supply constitutes cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment under CIL, based on citations to Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 
2d 1080, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 2004); and Xuncax 
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995)); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (concluding that 
the definition of torture under CIL does not require acts to be undertaken while the victim is in custody 
and pursuant to official state policy and citing a federal statute, a ratified treaty, and two non-binding 
federal precedents for support); Doe, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1321–25 (citing non-binding federal precedent 
and an affidavit from international law scholars in concluding that the plaintiff had stated a claim for 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under CIL); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 (citing a case from 
the European Court of Human Rights in concluding that certain acts constituted cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment).  
 154.  See supra note 74. 
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principle155 and to expropriate the property of their own nationals.156 For this 
reason, one might defend the case law on the ground that it reliably captures 
the predominant sense of the U.S. legal community, methodological issues 
notwithstanding. 
        But that prevailing sense is largely a matter of faith. Strictly speaking, one 
cannot know that any rule qualifies as CIL under the traditional doctrine 
without evaluating state practice and opinio juris, and yet, few have conducted 
such an inquiry with respect to even a single rule at a particular moment in 
history, much less the entire corpus of norms that American judges and 
practitioners have come to accept as such. The problem of the false-consensus 
effect cautions against such faith and suggests that some norms might appear 
obviously correct simply because of our own insularity.157 Moreover, many of 
the cases raised questions that lack an obvious resolution even on principles 
of faith. Some claims required courts to decide not simply the existence of a 
norm but its precise features. In United States v. Ali, for example, the issue was 
not whether CIL prohibits piracy, a topic on which few in the American legal 
community would disagree, but whether that prohibition includes a ban on 
acts of aiding and abetting piracy,158 a topic on which the dominant sensibility 
provides little insight. Other claims concerned norms that are contested even 
within the United States. Courts have been divided, for instance, on whether 
CIL prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment;159 provides for 
corporate liability;160 and requires exhaustion of local remedies.161 On these 
issues, at the very least, the choice not to thoroughly examine state practice 
and opinio juris creates a risk of error. In some cases, courts might decline to 
recognize a norm that qualifies for the status of custom, while in others they 
might recognize a norm that fails to qualify. 
       This risk also has an intertemporal dimension. As the product of a 
constantly changing aggregation of what states do and say, CIL has a capacity 
to evolve organically, including within short periods of time.162 The result is 
 155.  See, e.g., United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 156.  See, e.g., Best Med. Belgium, Inc. v. Kingdom of Belgium, 913 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 
(E.D. Va. 2012).  
157.  To be clear, this is not to say that CIL should not accord with predominant Western 
views, or even that it does not. The point is strictly epistemological—regardless of what one might 
hope CIL to be, few undertake the effort to know what it is in fact.   
 158.  See United States v. Ali, 982 F. Supp. 2d 85, 86 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 159.  Compare Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that CIL 
prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) with Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
 160.  Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that CIL provides for corporate liability) with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding otherwise). 
 161.  Compare Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that CIL requires exhaustion of local remedies) with Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 
1219–20 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding otherwise). 
 162.  See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND 
THEORY 513, 532 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983) (proposing a concept 
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that even where a federal court has correctly identified the applicable norm 
at a particular moment of adjudication, other courts’ reliance on that decision 
as precedent might, over the long run, underplay the possibility that the norm 
has since evolved, and that small distinctions in international and domestic 
application can accrete into major differences. This is the possibility of a 
normative Galapagos effect—an idiosyncratic local evolution decoupled from 
the broader international environment. 
       To be sure, many contend that there is more than one permissible 
approach to the identification of CIL. The so-called traditional method, and 
the one I have emphasized so far, operates by an inductive process that 
identifies custom on the basis of broad surveys of state practice over time.163 
But a competing “modern” method operates through a process of deduction, 
whereby norms can be derived from official statements such as General 
Assembly resolutions and fundamental principles, rather than the practice of 
states.164 If federal courts are simply following this latter approach, then their 
tendency to ignore foreign state practice may still yield doctrinally justifiable 
conclusions. 
       The problem with this view is that it lacks support in the case law. To the 
extent that judges talked about methods, they repeatedly expressed a 
commitment to the inductive approach.165 This was true even in areas such as 
human rights,166 where the deductive method appears to be more influential 
in legal scholarship and international practice.167 Moreover, it is doubtful that 
even the modern approach justifies parochialism. It is one thing to question 
the importance of state practice, but quite another to say that the United 
States and its Western allies are the primary or even only relevant expositors 
of global norms. 
       The common method in the federal courts may also operate in tension 
with the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision, where the majority held that the ATS 
empowers federal courts to recognize common law causes of action only for 
violations of international norms that are “accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with [adequate] specificity.”168 Foreign relations was one of the 
principal justifications for this restraint: attempts to craft remedies for the 
violation of new norms “should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution,” 
of instant custom); Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 329–40 (2014) (providing examples of rapid developments in CIL and 
characterizing them as “Grotian Moments”). 
 163.  Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 
619 F.3d 1, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131; Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. Supp. 2d 
1222, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2012); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 631 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 166.  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120; Garcia, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
 167.  Roberts, supra note 163, at 759, 764–66 (citing scholars who argue that modern custom 
is an important source of human rights norms and offering a theoretical justification for reliance 
on the deductive process in that context). 
168.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
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due to the “risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.”169 Yet in looking 
primarily to domestic authority and hardly ever to foreign government 
sources, especially those of non-European states, federal courts often fail to 
ensure that the precise features of the norms they recognize are in fact 
accepted as CIL by the civilized world. Particularly in an increasingly 
multipolar order, the idea that “civilization” exists only in the West is plainly 
antiquated even as a purely descriptive matter.170 To identify norms on the 
basis of such a focus seems to risk precisely the foreign policy consequences 
that Sosa aims to avoid. 
        The tendency not to follow the traditional doctrine might also have other 
adverse effects abroad. Melissa Waters has argued that foreign courts are less 
likely to cite American precedents that have not attempted to engage seriously 
with foreign and international sources,171 and at least one Canadian Supreme 
Court Justice seems to agree.172 If other foreign judges share this view, then 
parochialism may very well decrease the global influence of U.S. precedent. 
Equally significant, the tendency to focus on U.S. sources might strain 
relations with affected states. Some governments have complained that ATS 
cases amount to judicial imperialism,173 but such objections might justifiably 
intensify where federal courts not only purport to decide the legality of 
foreign government acts, but also rely upon a heavily domesticated version of 
CIL in doing so. 
 169.  Id. at 728. 
 170.  See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008). 
171.  Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue 
in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 557 (2005) (suggesting that the 
purported development of CIL through under-inclusive analyses of state practice and opinio juris 
“greatly decreases the likelihood that U.S. norms will influence the development of international 
legal norms on a given issue”). 
 172.  See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 38 (1998) (“[T]he most useful judgments for courts 
looking to comparative sources are those that use comparative materials themselves, and situate 
their judgments in the context of international debates and discussions. Decisions which look 
only inward, which see only the situation in the place where they are rendered, have less relevance 
to those outside that jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 173.  See Mark Sherman, Justices Weigh Foreigners’ Suits vs. Companies, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 26, 
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.nhregister.com/article/NH/20120226/NEWS/302269807 (quoting 
South African President Thabo Mbeki as saying that an ATS suit against multinational companies that 
had been associated with apartheid amounted to “judicial imperialism”); see also Brief of the 
Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 29, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (arguing that the exercise of jurisdiction over ATS claims 
that lack a sufficient nexus to U.S. territory is “entirely inappropriate” and citing “ample evidence” that 
such jurisdiction generates international disputes); Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) (characterizing the 
“unreasonable extraterritorial application of the ATS” as “unacceptable”); John B. Bellinger III, 
Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2, 8 (2009) (reporting that “the ATS has given rise to friction, sometimes 
considerable, in our relations with foreign governments,” and that “we are regarded as something 
of a rogue actor” in the way we use the statute). 
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        Some might argue in response that a strong national orientation is 
precisely the point, especially in human rights cases. Courts and litigants, in 
other words, hold no illusion that all governments share American views 
about CIL, but purposefully characterize those views as international law 
anyway in order to propagate and strengthen the norms in question. I suspect 
that few would admit to this sort of rhetorical maneuver, but either way, its 
underlying assumption that American views lack sufficient global resonance 
to permit safe engagement with a broad array of foreign legal authorities 
seems to overcorrect for the opposite assumption that American views are 
universal. While more inclusive research and citation practices might 
jeopardize some norms by revealing a lack of common understanding, those 
practices might just as easily vindicate dominant domestic perceptions by 
clarifying the existence of broad global consensus, and in turn strengthen the 
legitimacy with which U.S. courts promote those norms that qualify. 
        At the same time, parochialism is not without potential benefits. For 
example, the common practice probably makes CIL more palatable in the 
domestic setting. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have argued that the 
application of CIL as federal common law “is in tension with basic notions of 
American representative democracy” because custom is not “generated by 
U.S. lawmaking processes,” but instead “derived from the views and practices 
of the international community,” which is “‘neither representative of the 
American political community nor responsive to it.’”174 Whatever the merits 
of this position as a purely theoretical matter, the evidence discussed above 
takes some of the wind from its sails. The courts’ primary reliance upon U.S. 
government sources, American authors, and authorities from multilateral 
institutions within which the United States exercises significant influence 
means that CIL in federal court is far more an American creation than the 
traditional doctrine would have it. Moreover, the clear preponderance of 
Western European sources among the foreign citations shows that foreign 
influence is largely confined to states that more or less share basic American 
values. CIL in federal court is decidedly not dependent upon the practices 
and positions of ideologically hostile or culturally dissimilar states. Thus, if the 
domestic application of custom is undemocratic, it is so in much the same way 
that the application of garden-variety federal common law is undemocratic; 
the issue is not so much foreign influence as the unelected character of the 
judicial expositor. 
B. THE CENTRALITY OF COURTS 
       A second implication is one of confirmation. Although much of the 
evidence to date has been anecdotal and impressionistic, scholars have noted 
that municipal courts hold an increasingly important role in the development 
of CIL, not only because questions about custom have become more common 
 174.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 857 (1997) (quoting Phillip R. 
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 721 (1986)).  
2016] FINDING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 1941 
in domestic litigation,175 but also because courts frequently look to foreign 
case law in deciding those questions.176 My findings are largely consistent with 
these observations. To identify the contours of contested norms, federal 
courts considered non-binding precedent from other federal courts more 
than any other source, foreign judicial decisions more than any foreign 
government acts beside treaty participation, and the decisions of international 
tribunals more than any other multilateral source. Moreover, the cited 
academic publications followed a similar pattern by citing to domestic, 
foreign, and international judicial opinions more than almost any other 
authorities. 
        As a matter of U.S. foreign relations law, this development stands in 
contrast to the federal judiciary’s traditional timidity in cases implicating 
foreign affairs.177 Congress and the executive branch, after all, were virtually 
absent from both the opinions and the cited academic sources even while 
citations to case law were ubiquitous. CIL is an area in which courts appear 
perfectly willing to resolve questions without input from the political 
branches, institutional limitations notwithstanding.178 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS 
       Third, the data suggest that CIL as we understand it hinges, to a 
significant degree, not upon the general and consistent practice and opinio 
juris of states, but upon the vagaries of a fundamentally unprincipled system 
of access to information about practice and opinio juris. There is no single 
database that organizes the multifarious types of authority on which CIL may 
hinge. Westlaw and Lexis provide extensive resources on U.S. law, substantial 
databases of treaties and ICJ precedent, and even some foreign legal 
materials.179 International organizations such as the United Nations provide 
online access to official reports and resolutions.180 And many states provide 
searchable, online databases of their public laws.181 But not all of these 
resources are in English, finding them can require some ingenuity, and 
providers generally do not coordinate with one another. The result is a 
 175.  See Antonios Tzanakopoulos & Christian J. Tams, Introduction: Domestic Courts as Agents 
of Development of International Law, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 531, 533–34 (2013). 
 176.  See Roberts, supra note 47, at 58 (discussing these trends). 
 177.  See Koh, supra note 111, at 1305–17. 
 178.  See Waters, supra note 171, at 520 (“Courts participating in [transnational judicial 
dialogue] are becoming increasingly less deferential to executive branch prerogatives in foreign 
policy . . . .”). 
 179.  The standard Westlaw account for U.S. academics offers searchable databases of cases from 
the courts of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, and Korea, plus treatises on the laws 
of a number of other jurisdictions. See International Materials, THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/InternationalMaterials?transitionType (last visited 
May 8, 2016). 
 180.  See Annual Reports, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 
documents/reports/ (last visited May 8, 2016). 
 181.  See infra note 205 (linking to the Library of Congress collection of foreign law 
databases). 
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patchwork system with a subtle, if largely unintentional politics—states will 
possess power to influence foreign perceptions of CIL only insofar as their 
laws and policies are available to foreign legal audiences in influential 
languages. 
        The importance of access in turn raises questions for information 
providers. Why, for example, does the standard Westlaw account for 
American academics provide access to Korean but not Japanese cases? And 
what is the justification for offering a database on EU law but not the laws of 
China and Russia? One can guess at market- or translation-based 
explanations, among others. But it is fair to question whether these should 
suffice. Entities like Westlaw and Lexis exert enormous power over how the 
legal profession understands CIL simply by choosing whether to make 
available and how to organize foreign and international authorities. Surely it 
is no coincidence that the cases comprising the data set included far more 
citations to the laws of states that are available in the popular databases. 
D. COMPARISONS TO OTHER COURTS 
        Other implications are comparative. As discussed earlier, Choi and 
Gulati recently conducted a study to identify tendencies in the process by 
which international tribunals ascertain custom.182 Their primary conclusion 
is that these “courts do not come anywhere close to engaging in the type of 
analysis the officially stated two-part rule . . . sets up,” but instead “generally 
engage[] in a forward-looking or aspirational exercise” that discounts 
historical practice.183 According to their findings, treaties were the most 
commonly cited materials at nearly 33% of all sources in the data set, followed 
by international tribunal cases (16%), domestic cases (8%), actions by states 
(8%), academic articles and treatises (7%), reports from international 
interest groups such as the Red Cross and the International Law Association 
(7%), domestic statutes (7%), UN resolutions (5%), UN reports (5%), 
statements by state officials (3%), and party agreements (2%).184 On the basis 
of these numbers, Choi and Gulati conclude inter alia that international 
courts examine statements of national government officials only rarely, that 
international treaties are the most influential type of evidence, and that 
academic sources are somewhat unimportant.185 
       While the Choi and Gulati study covered a longer period of time and 
employed a slightly different coding strategy,186 their results suggest 
 182.  See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text 
183. Choi & Gulati, supra note 34, at 146–47. 
 184.  Id. at 132. I use Choi and Gulati’s labels in listing these source categories and refer the reader 
to their paper for clarification on the definitions they have attached to them. See id. at 128–31. 
 185.  See id. at 131–46. 
 186.  The cases they considered ranged from recent opinions of the International Court of Justice 
to decisions issued by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which existed from 1922 to 1946. 
See id. at 126; Permanent Court of International Justice, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/?p1=9 
(last visited May 8, 2016). As for coding strategies, Choi and Gulati created separate categories for 
“domestic cases,” “actions by states,” “domestic statutes,” and “statements by state officials.” Choi & 
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important points of similarity and contrast. On one hand, neither 
international nor U.S courts follow the traditional doctrine; judges tend to 
focus primarily on other types of evidence. But the types of evidence on which 
they focus differ in several ways. International courts, for example, cite more 
frequently to other international courts, while U.S. courts cite more 
frequently to other U.S. courts. International courts also cite more to 
multilateral treaties, but less to academic sources. And while Choi and Gulati’s 
study does not document trends in source nationality, it is probably safe to 
assume that international tribunals do not rely as heavily on U.S. legal 
authorities. Figure 31 illustrates these differences by showing, for each type 
of court, the percentage of the cited sources belonging to each source 
subcategory.187 
        The study results also make it possible to compare contemporary and 
earlier methods in the domestic context. Examining sources the Supreme 
Court utilized to identify CIL from 1861 to 1900, David Bederman found that 
while the Court’s rhetoric emphasized the importance of state practice, 
“direct evidence of the actual practice of states” was “notably absent” from the 
decisions.188 This sounds quite familiar. Yet there are important differences as 
well. Rather than federal judicial opinions, the “writing of international law 
scholars or ‘publicists’” was “far and away the most common” source in the 
earlier cases.189 And somewhat surprisingly, the academic sources may have 
been less parochial than they are today, even if comparably Western. 
Bederman reports that the Court showed “little favoritism” toward influential 
American commentators and “seemed comfortable citing French, Spanish, 
and Italian sources (through competent English versions), occasionally 
rendering their own translations.”190 This point calls into question the view 
that municipal courts’ application of CIL has become less parochial in recent 
years.191 And given that Western Europe represented a far larger portion of 
the recognized community of states in the post-Civil War period, it is not 
implausible that the earlier approach enabled the Court to ascertain custom 
with greater accuracy than the federal courts of today. 
Gulati, supra note 34, at 132. In contrast, I created separate categories for different types of U.S. 
authority, but categorized all citations to foreign government sources as citations to “foreign state 
practice.” See supra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
 187.  This Figure leaves out subcategories of sources that do not have clear equivalents in the 
Choi and Gulati study. For example, the Figure omits my numbers on citations to federal judicial 
opinions, federal statutes, and executive branch sources because Choi and Gulati did not 
separately code for those authorities.  
 188.  Bederman, supra note 28, at 109. 
 189.  Id. at 105. 
 190.  Id. at 106 
 191.  Cf. Yuval Shany, National Courts as International Actors: Jurisdictional Implications, 
FEDERALISMI.IT (July 29, 2007), http://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?artid= 
13810 (suggesting that a “certain quantitative and qualitative change is taking place in the 
manner international law is being applied by national courts: more international law is applied 
by more national courts in a more consequential (and less parochial) way”). 
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Figure 31. Comparison of Citation Patterns 
E. A NEW APPROACH TO CUSTOM? 
        While contemporary judicial methods are problematic under the 
traditional doctrine, the data also raise the possibility that the more 
fundamental problem is the doctrine itself. The evidence that courts simply 
do not follow the two-part test is increasingly abundant. As discussed above, 
Choi and Gulati found that international tribunals do not apply the test, and 
in a recent article Stefan Talmon reached a similar conclusion, observing that 
“in a majority of cases the [International Court of Justice] has not examined 
the practice and opinio juris of states but, instead, has simply asserted the 
rules that it applies.”192 David Bederman’s research suggests a similar 
tendency in U.S. Supreme Court cases,193 and as Jack Goldsmith and Eric 
Posner have argued, even The Paquette Habana, perhaps the Court’s most 
famous and influential decision on CIL, is riddled with evidentiary 
deficiencies.194 Combining this evidence with the data revealed above, it is 
worth considering: Of what value is a doctrine that no courts and few scholars 
appear to follow? Is there something to the traditional approach, or is it just 
a fig leaf for national and Western bias? 
       Some have responded to the evidence of methodological and other 
difficulties by arguing for a reconceptualization of custom. Curtis Bradley, for 
example, recently offered a “common law account,” whereby international 
courts develop CIL by looking to past practice while “necessarily mak[ing] 
choices about how to describe the practice, which baselines to apply in 
evaluating it, and whether and when to extend or analogize it to new 
 192.  Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology Between 
Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417, 441 (2015).  
193. See generally Bederman, supra note 28. 
 194.  See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66–78 (2005) 
(scrutinizing the evidentiary basis for the Court’s decision in The Paquette Habana, which purported to 
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situations.”195 Others have advocated rational choice models196 or doctrinal 
tweaks that place greater emphasis on either state practice or opinio juris.197 
        These are important proposals with deep and varied implications, and 
for their advocates, the data discussed above might bolster the argument for 
reforming or abandoning the traditional test. Yet there are at least a couple 
of reasons for caution. First, the two-part test has value insofar as it formally 
honors state consent, without geographic or cultural limitation. Any 
replacement that aspires for global acceptance would presumably need to 
share that characteristic, one result of which would be to hold parochialism 
in a state of continued illegitimacy. It is not clear, in other words, that 
contemporary methods would fare much better even under a new concept of 
CIL. Indeed, I am unaware of any proposal that aims to justify or apologize 
for an overwhelmingly Western focus. Even under Bradley’s proposal, which 
acknowledges substantial judicial discretion,198 courts would presumably still 
need to conduct at least moderately inclusive global surveys. Second, it may 
be too early to give up on the traditional doctrine. While courts have had a 
difficult time adhering to it, judges are not operating in a static technological 
or informational environment. Surely it is easier to research foreign law now 
than at any prior point in world history, given economic development, the 
expansion of international connectivity, the proliferation of legal research 
databases, and the increasing sophistication of automated translation. Many 
anticipate, moreover, that these developments will continue.199 It would be 
unfortunate if courts and scholars gave up on the longstanding doctrine just 
as technology rendered it practical. Indeed, one might argue that the 
problem with the traditional doctrine is simply its futurism; it presumes a level 
of access to foreign information that technology is only beginning to provide. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
       There is no easy way to find custom in accordance with the established 
doctrine, but courts, parties, and scholars can undertake a variety of measures 
to mitigate the challenge. In offering these, I operate on the assumption that 
 195.  Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY, CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 34, 49 (2016). 
Although it would have to operate within the limits of Sosa and associated constitutional 
understandings, it is conceivable that this account might also apply to federal courts. 
 196.  See generally Guzman, supra note 17 (arguing for a rational choice lens for CIL). 
 197.  See generally BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (2010) (arguing for a doctrine that focuses exclusively on opinio juris). 
 198.  See Choi & Gulati, supra note 34. 
 199.  See Nataly Kelly, Ray Kurzweil on Translation Technology, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 
3:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nataly-kelly/ray-kurzweil-on-translati_b_875745.html 
(“Well-known inventor, author, and futurist Ray Kurzweil [predicts that computers] will reach human 
levels of translation quality by the year 2029.”); Digital Life in 2025: Experts Predict the Internet will Become 
“Like Electricity”—Less Visible, yet More Deeply Embedded in People’s Lives for Good and Ill, PEW RES. CTR. 6, 
28–29 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/03/PIP_Report_Future_of_the_ 
Internet_Predictions_031114.pdf (surveying experts who anticipate that the Internet will evolve to 
feature even greater global connectivity and facilitate broader access to foreign information). 
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the two-part test will continue to operate as the recognized doctrine in both 
international law and federal common law. 
       First, both sides of the bench can become familiar with and emulate the 
work of the most impressive judicial opinions to date. In the post-Sosa era, 
several decisions stand out as particularly well-researched, including Judge 
Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,200 Judge Katzmann’s 
concurrence in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.,201 Judge Bybee’s 
dissent in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,202 and Judge Davis’s decision in United States 
v. Hasan.203 These opinions may or may not reach the right conclusions on
the merits, but they are noteworthy for the rigor with which their authors 
considered a large and diverse set of materials—the citation patterns were less 
nationalistic than most, included an array of multilateral and academic 
authorities, and even considered some foreign government sources.204 By 
reviewing these decisions, judges and litigants, particularly those who are 
unfamiliar with CIL, can develop a sense for the best practices of the federal 
judiciary. 
        Second, American legal scholars can follow the lead of some of their 
European counterparts and commit to study state practice and opinio juris in 
a more inclusive fashion.205 Courts need access to research that focuses not 
just on the familiar American, British, and other European sources that are 
already widely available, but also sources from non-Western states. This 
particular type of research is not en vogue in the United States, but academic 
writers are clearly in the best position to provide it. Unlike judges and litigants, 
they tend to have expertise in international or comparative law, and operate 
free from the docket pressures that severely limit the potential for exhaustive 
inquiry. Moreover, this kind of research is easier now than it has ever been. 
The Library of Congress, for example, has an extensive collection of links to 
underutilized government databases on the law of virtually every foreign 
 200.  See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149–82 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J., concurring). 
 201.  See generally Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264–84 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 202.  See generally Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1224–46 (9th Cir. 2007) (Bybee, 
J., dissenting).  
 203.  See generally United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 204.  An excellent model from an international tribunal is the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s 
decision in Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (citing multiple treaties and dozens of foreign legal authorities from a 
diverse set of countries en route to concluding that the prohibition of terror against a civilian 
population has the status of customary international law).  
 205.  See, e.g., Alston, supra note 138 (surveying state practice in support of the view that CIL 
prohibits summary execution); Talmon, supra note 139 (collecting evidence of foreign state 
practice and opinio juris in arguing that the meaning of “terrorism” is unsettled in CIL); 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 142, at 3–5 (surveying foreign state practices and 
statements in support of the proposition that CIL requires combatants to distinguish between 
themselves and civilians in conducting military operations). 
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state.206 Particularly given the increasing ease of comparative research, the 
tendency for current scholarship to ignore the numerical majority of 
international society seems hard to justify. 
       Third, courts can make use of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in cases where the briefing fails to provide sufficient evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris. This rule provides that in determining foreign 
law, a court “may consider any relevant material or source, including 
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”207 The rule’s standard application focuses on pure 
questions of foreign law,208 but CIL is derivative of foreign law insofar as the 
traditional doctrine holds that state practice can take the form of foreign 
judicial decisions, statutes, constitutions, regulations, and a wide range of 
other similar authorities.209 As the Restatement (Third) acknowledges, 
“questions of foreign law and of international law are often intermingled.”210 
Under the proposed application, courts would not utilize Rule 44.1 to identify 
CIL per se, but rather to facilitate the predicate identification of foreign state 
practices that may or may not amount to CIL. This application would enable 
a court to “engage in its own research and consider any relevant material thus 
found.”211 Alternatively, where courts decide against this option, they might 
respond to deficient briefing not by concluding definitively that a norm is 
absent, but rather that the norm’s proponent has failed to provide sufficient 
supporting evidence. 
        Fourth, legal database companies and other information-providers 
should consider doing more to improve the quality and availability of their 
offerings. The ideal would be a single, searchable database that contains 
comprehensive and translated collections of the laws of all states. A slightly 
less helpful but, for now, more realistic alternative would allow users to search 
simultaneously the international law digests of all states that publish them. 
The development of these resources will make it easier for courts, litigants, 
and scholars to conduct inclusive analyses and in doing so strengthen the 
legitimacy of U.S. precedent abroad. 
       Finally, the data raise questions for additional research. For example, is 
parochialism equally common abroad? If U.S. courts are global outliers and 
other states adhere more closely to the traditional doctrine, then it will be that 
much harder to justify the methods that tend to appear in American cases. If, 
 206.  Nations, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations.php (last visited May 
8, 2016). The databases are mostly available only in native languages, but online translation options 
are readily available and improving in quality. 
 207.  FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. 
 208.  See, e.g., Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying 
44.1 to decide a question of Japanese law, and explaining that the Rule “permits foreign law to 
be proved by testimony or affidavits of experts,” and “also permits judges to consult other sources 
of foreign law, such as articles, treatises, and judicial opinions”). 
 209.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102 reporters’ notes 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
210.  Id. § 113 reporters’ notes 1.
211.  FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules–1966.
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on the other hand, other courts exhibit similar patterns of national 
orientation, inattention to foreign government sources, limited 
multilateralism, and reliance upon academic publications that only rarely 
examine state practice and opinio juris, then we might fairly question whether 
the traditional doctrine has any bearing in reality. 
       Relatedly, do the courts of other states engage in similarly high rates of 
citation to academic sources, and if so, who are the cited authors? If foreign 
courts tend to focus on the potentially distinctive scholarship of their own 
nationals, then judicial decisions will be more likely to reach conflicting 
conclusions about contested norms and, in doing so, contribute to norm 
fragmentation. If, on the other hand, foreign courts also rely 
disproportionately on academics from the West, then the prospects for 
fragmentation may drop as courts around the world operate under the soft 
power of American and European scholarship. 
        Still another question is whether the pattern of multilateralism makes up 
for parochialism and delegation. If multilateral treaties, UN resolutions and 
reports, international judicial decisions, and other similar materials accurately 
reflect the practice and opinio juris of many states, then there will be far less 
reason to care about the problems associated with the other kinds of sources. 
But if the multilateral authorities fail to capture state practice or exaggerate 
the influence of the West, then they will do far less to improve the quality of 
the analysis. 
VII. CONCLUSION
        International and federal common law have long held that CIL depends 
upon the existence of both general and consistent state practice and opinio 
juris. Yet citation patterns suggest that federal courts do not follow this 
doctrine. Courts depend heavily on portrayals of CIL in other U.S. 
government sources, rarely consider direct evidence of foreign state practice, 
focus almost exclusively on the advanced democracies of the West even when 
they do look abroad, and cite to Western academics who exhibit a similar 
tendency to focus on the laws and policies of the West. In short, federal courts 
are not applying customary international law in any strict doctrinal sense. The 
norms they have framed as CIL are domestic and Western norms that simply 
may or may not align with the practices and views of a clear majority of states. 
To a significant degree, this is probably a product of resource limitations over 
which courts have little control. Yet there are a number of steps that judges, 
litigants, and scholars can take to mitigate the current challenges. Judges and 
parties can acquaint themselves with best practices, scholars can expand the 
scope of their research to consider non-Western sources, courts can make use 
of Rule 44.1 to supplement deficient briefing, and information providers can 
expand their offerings in foreign law. Over time, such measures will help 
courts to adhere more closely to the established doctrine and enhance the 
legitimacy of the law that is international custom. 
